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Terror attacks pose a serious threat to public safety and national
security. New technologies assist these attacks, magnify them, and
render them deadlier. The more funding terrorist organizations
manage to raise, the greater their capacity to recruit members, organize, and commit terror attacks. Since the September 11, 2001
terror attacks, law enforcement agencies have increased their efforts to develop more anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering regulations, which are designed to block the flow of financing of terrorism and cut off its oxygen. However, at present, most regulatory
measures focus on traditional currencies. As these restrictions become more successful, the likelihood that cryptocurrencies will be
used as an alternative to fund illicit behaviors grows. Furthermore,
the COVID-19 virus and subsequent social distancing guidelines
have increased the use of cryptocurrencies for money laundering,
material support to terror, and other financial crimes.
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Cryptocurrencies—electronically generated and stored tokens
which can be exchanged via a decentralized payment system—are a
game-changer, significantly affecting market functions like never
before and making it easier to finance terrorism and other types of
criminal activity. These decentralized and (usually) anonymous currencies facilitate a high volume of transactions, allowing terrorists
to engage in extensive fundraising, management, transfer, and
spending for illegal activities. As cryptocurrencies gain popularity,
the issue of regulating them becomes more urgent. This Article proposes to reform cryptocurrency regulation. It advocates for mandatory obligations directed at cryptocurrency issuers, wallet providers, and exchanges to verify the identity of users on the blockchain.
Thus, courts could grant warrants obligating cryptocurrency-issuing companies to unmask the identity of cryptocurrency users when
there is probable cause that their activities support terrorism or
other money laundering schemes. Such reforms would stifle terrorism and other types of criminal activity financed through cryptocurrencies, curbing harmful activities and promoting national security.
In recognition of the legal challenges this solution poses, this Article
also addresses substantial objections that might be raised regarding
the proposed reforms, such as innovation concerns, First Amendment arguments, and Fourth Amendment protections. It concludes
by addressing measures to efficiently promote application of the
proposed reforms.
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INTRODUCTION
“U.S. Seizes Bitcoin Said to Be Used to Finance Terrorist Groups.”1
Recently, the U.S. government seized roughly $2 million in
Bitcoin and other types of cryptocurrencies from accounts that sent
or received funds in alleged financing schemes for foreign terrorist
organizations such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (“ISIS”).2 These tokens were fundraised on social media.3 The
affiliated terrorist organizations believed that using cryptocurrencies promised complete anonymity.4 However, the government has
developed tools that can override websites used to solicit terrorist
funds and compel information about the accounts involved.5 Yet, the
investigation of donor identities continues.6 These efforts constituted “the first significant civil forfeiture actions to seize cryptocurrency as part of counterterrorism financing investigations.”7
On August 28, 2015, “Ali Shukri Amin was sentenced to
[eleven] years in prison to be followed by a lifetime of supervised
1

Charlie Savage, U.S. Seizes Bitcoin Said to Be Used to Finance Terrorist Groups,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2020), nyti.ms/3aPiDAL [https://perma.cc/M855-6247].
2
See id.
3
See id. For more information on fundraising campaigns for supporting terrorism, see
Andrew Mines & Devorah Margolin, Cryptocurrency and the Dismantling of Terrorism
Financing Campaigns, LAWFARE (Aug. 26, 2020, 9:02 AM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/cryptocurrency-and-dismantling-terrorism-financing-campaigns
[https://perma.cc/7FKF-W3PR].
4
See Savage, supra note 1.
5
See id.
6
See id.
7
Id.
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release and monitoring of his internet activities for conspiring to
provide material support and resources to the ISIL,” commonly
known as ISIS.8 On June 11, 2015, Amin pled guilty.9 He confessed
“to using Twitter to provide advice and encouragement to [ISIS] and
its supporters . . . .”10 Using the Twitter handle @Amreekiwitness,
Amin, “provided instructions on how to use Bitcoin, a virtual currency, to mask the provision of funds to [ISIS], as well as facilitation
to [ISIS] supporters seeking to travel to Syria to fight with [ISIS].”11
Amin used this account to conduct Twitter-based conversations regarding ways to develop financial support for ISIS using cryptocurrencies—electronically-generated and stored currencies that enable
users to trade objects with one another—and establish a secure funding system for ISIS.12 For instance, “Amin tweeted a link to an article he had written entitled ‘Bitcoin wa’ Sadaqat al-Jihad’ (Bitcoin
and the Charity of Jihad),”13 which discussed “how to use bitcoins
and how jihadists could utilize this currency to fund their efforts,”
including statements about setting up anonymous donation systems
to send Bitcoin money to the mujahedeen.14
In January 2015, Haaretz, a daily Israeli news outlet, reported
on the first instance of an ISIS fundraising for its terror cell using
Bitcoin on the dark net.15 The fundraiser was run by a man identified
as Abu-Mustafa, whose Bitcoin account number indicated he raised

8

See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, EMERGING TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS 36 (2015),
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3ML8-9J9X] [hereinafter FATF REPORT].
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Danna Harman, U.S.-Based ISIS Cell Fundraising on the Dark Web, New Evidence
Suggests,
HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-1.639542
[https://perma.cc/S3QZ-4ZJ5] (Apr. 10, 2018). The “dark net” is also referred to as the
dark web. It is an encrypted network of websites connected to one another. The dark net is
part of the greater deep web. The deep web includes all unindexed websites that don’t pop
up when you do an internet search. See generally Gabriel Weimann, Going Darker? The
Challenge of Dark Net Terrorism, WILSON CTR. (2018), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/going_darker_challenge_of_dark_net_ter
rorism.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT6H-JVA9].
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five Bitcoins (approximately $1,000 USD) before the FBI shut down
his account.16
The currency used in the abovementioned transactions was
Bitcoin—the first and perhaps most well-known cryptocurrency.17
Cryptocurrencies are electronically generated and stored tokens that
individuals can exchange via a decentralized payment system called
a blockchain.18 The blockchain is a peer-to-peer network, which allows users to trade the tokens without relying on banks or other financial institutions, thus cutting out the financial intermediaries and
eliminating their fees.19 Though Bitcoin is the first cryptocurrency,20
there are new cryptocurrencies tailored for different audiences.21
Scholars dub this disruptive technology as a “trust machine,”22 because it eliminates reliance on traditional institutional intermediaries
16

See Harman, supra note 15. For expansion and more examples of the use of
cryptocurrencies for terrorism, see Zachary K. Goldman et al., Terrorist Use of Virtual
Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC. 12–13 (May 2017),
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReportTerroristFinancing-Final.pdf?mtime=20170502033819&focal=none
[https://perma.cc/5BJN-55VA].
17
CYNTHIA DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., TERRORISTS USE OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES: TECHNICAL
AND ORGANIZATIONAL BARRIERS AND FUTURE THREATS 48 (RAND CORP. 2019)
(“Currently, despite an increase in their use, altcoins are not a large part of the total
cryptocurrency market, which is still almost completely dominated by Bitcoin.”). It should
be noted that Bitcoin is not the only cryptocurrency. There are over 5,000 cryptocurrencies
in the world right now and this number is rapidly growing. See Stephen Wilks, The
Reimagined Schoolyard: Cryptocurrency’s Adoption in Tomorrow’s International
Monetary Order, 2020 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 34 (2020) (“More than 5,000
cryptocurrencies exist today, with Bitcoin being the most common, dominating more than
sixty percent of the virtual currency market with more than 18 million units valued around
$9,000 (U.S.) per coin.”).
18
See D. Towne Morton, The Future of Cryptocurrency: An Unregulated Instrument in
an Increasingly Regulated Global Economy, 16 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 129, 130
(2020); Henry S. Zaytoun, Cyber Pickpockets: Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, and the Law
of Theft, 97 N.C. L. REV. 395, 402 (2019).
19
See Primavera De Filippi, Blockchain Technology and Decentralized Governance:
The Pitfalls of a Trustless Dream, HAL, https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02445179/
document [https://perma.cc/2VGA-MHUQ].
20
See DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 57 (“Bitcoin, which was launched by the
pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto in early 2009, is both a protocol for securely storing and
transmitting tokens (virtual coins) and the name of the unit of value in the system.”).
21
Id. at 2 (discussing other cryptocurrencies, such as Omni Layer (MasterCoin),
BlackCoin, Zcash, Ether, Libra and many more).
22
The Trust Machine, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.economist.com/leaders/
2015/10/31/the-trust-machine [https://perma.cc/YSE8-Y2RA].
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in financial markets and operates within an ecosystem based on selfsovereign identities.23 As such, cryptocurrencies have potential to
revolutionize many sectors of our day-to-day lives.24 Some believe
this revolution could change perceptions of property, expression,
and identity.25
As coronavirus (“COVID–19”) erupted, the use of cryptocurrencies increased.26 One plausible explanation is the public’s growing
distrust in institutions and traditional financial intermediaries, increasing demand for alternatives.27 The decentralized and anonymous cryptocurrency model is a natural candidate, as cryptocurrencies store value and remain borderless. 28 They can be purchased
from almost anywhere in the world and subsequently used in most
countries without a need for exchange or transfer.29 From the consumers’ perspective, cryptocurrencies are beneficial to circumventing intermediaries, thereby making financial services cheaper and
23

See De Filippi, supra note 19.
See generally Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, How the Tech Behind Bitcoin Will
Change Your Life, TIME (May 6, 2016, 10:22 AM), time.com/4320254/blockchain-techbehind-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/5NV4-953Q].
25
Timothy C. May, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/
6.805/articles/crypto/cypherpunks/may-crypto-manifesto.html [https://perma.cc/8BBPNU6A].
26
See generally Hadar Jabotinsky & Roee Sarel, How Crisis Affects Crypto:
Coronavirus as a Test Case (Mar. 23, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3557929 [https://perma.cc/
8XAA-VEX9].
27
See generally Jannik Lockl & Jens-Christian Stoetzer, Trust-Free Banking Missed the
Point—the Effect of Distrust in Banks on the Adoption of Decentralized Finance, EUR.
CONF. ON INFO. SYS. (2021), https://www.fim-rc.de/Paperbibliothek/Veroeffentlicht/
1153/wi-1153.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9CM-U6E8]; Dondi Black, Digital Currencies
Skyrocket During Pandemic, FIS (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.fisglobal.com/en/
insights/what-we-think/2021/january/digital-currencies-skyrocket-during-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/J4L2-N6HN].
28
Tom Sadon, Why Criminals Use Cryptocurrency, COGNYTE (Nov. 2, 2021), https://
www.cognyte.com/blog/5-reasons-why-criminals-are-turning-to-cryptocurrencies/
[https://perma.cc/E4DP-9RQE] (“Cryptocurrencies can be transferred quickly and easily
from one crypto address to another, whether they serve the same person or totally different
parties, locals or foreigners, acquaintances, or strangers. They are easily transferred
globally, thus enabling international trading, which, in the criminal setting, translates to
trafficking.”).
29
See The Opportunity of Cryptocurrencies for Cross-Border Trade and Marketplaces,
PENTAGON (Nov. 24, 2021), https://wearepentagon.com/2021/11/24/cryptocurrency-toenable-cross-border-trade/ [https://perma.cc/SW9P-SJZT].
24
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more inclusive.30 In the case of cryptocurrencies, consumers place
trust in technology, rather than in people, institutions, or intermediaries, which improves markets and businesses.
Yet, there is a downside: with great innovation comes social
costs. These governance models are especially vulnerable to harmful behaviors due to coin owners’ anonymity.31 They can be abused
by illicit actors, such as organized crime syndicates for plotting
money laundering schemes,32 expanding cross-border activities, facilitating and conducting cyberattacks, and demanding ransom,
among other acts.33 Cryptocurrencies can even be exploited for
crowd-funding campaigns and aid terrorists in soliciting funding.34
Social distancing guidelines that followed the COVID-19 virus
outbreak have included mandatory quarantines, air travel limitations, and boarder closings around the world.35 As a result, cryptocurrencies are increasingly used for illicit activities such as money
laundering, material support for acts of terror, and other financial
crimes.36 Much of this increase is caused by the general population
30

Daivi Rodima-Taylor & William W. Grimes, Cryptocurrencies and Digital Payment
Rails in Networked Global Governance: Perspectives on Inclusion and Innovation, in
BITCOIN AND BEYOND: CRYPTOCURRENCIES, BLOCKCHAINS, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
109, 110 (Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn ed., 2018) (“Cryptocurrencies can therefore
contribute towards more efficient remittance systems and enhance financial inclusion,
particularly in economies with inefficient payment systems and underdeveloped
infrastructures of traditional finance.”)
31
See id. at 121.
32
See, e.g., Alex Vet, Italian Mafia Launders Money Through Crypto, COINATORY (Apr.
6, 2019), bit.ly/2G0u1P8 [https://perma.cc/ZJ62-JV84].
33
See Brian Monroe, In Pandemic Fraud, Cyber Fusillades, More Criminals Choosing
Crypto to Buy Virtual Weapons, Get Paid After Successful Attacks: FinCEN, CERTIFIED
FIN. CRIME SPECIALISTS (May 15, 2020), https://www.acfcs.org/in-pandemic-fraud-cyberfusillades-more-criminals-choosing-crypto-to-buy-virtual-weapons-get-paid-aftersuccessful-attacks-fincen/ [https://perma.cc/6XS4-PK6H].
34
See Brenna Smith, The Evolution of Bitcoin in Terrorist Financing, BELLINGCAT
(Aug. 9, 2019), www.bellingcat.com/news/2019/08/09/the-evolution-of-bitcoin-interrorist-financing/ [https://perma.cc/H57H-XYYN]. This is also the reason behind
Canada’s Emergency Act which was invoked recently to target crowdfunding platforms
and the cryptopayment systems linked to them. See Sebastian Sinclair, Crypto Payments
Firms Face New Restrictions Under Canada’s Blockade Crackdown, BLOCKWORKS (Feb.
14, 2022, 8:05 PM), https://blockworks.co/crypto-payments-firms-face-new-restrictionsunder-canadas-blockade-crackdown/ [https://perma.cc/TVD7-WZSH].
35
See Jabotinsky & Sarel, supra note 16, at 3.
36
See Monroe, supra note 33.

526

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXXII:1

using cash less frequently, making it more difficult to launder
money through cash.37 Further, users’ anonymity on the blockchain
makes it more difficult for law enforcement agencies to identify and
track illegal transactions.38
As various regulatory measures are imposed on traditional financial systems to combat terrorism, terrorists’ use of cryptocurrencies is likely to increase, affecting how terrorism and related activities are financed.39 For example, “in the past several years, terrorist
groups in Gaza solicited support in Bitcoin,” much like ISIS.40 Cryptocurrencies allow terrorists to fund attacks more easily than fiat currencies,41 enabling more frequent and extensive attacks.42 For example:
[If supporters] are not donating as much to terrorist
groups as they did in the past because of an increase
in the legal and financial risks involved in doing so,
it is plausible that a sufficiently robust, secure, and
anonymous cryptocurrency could re-enable donations as a significant source of terrorism financing.43

37

For more information on how COVID-19 influences financial crimes, see generally
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, COVID-19-RELATED MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST
FINANCING: RISKS AND POLICY RESPONSES (2020), bit.ly/2M3MXzm [https://perma.cc/
YEJ4-T6EK]. On the abuse of cryptocurrency for buying weapons and supporting crime,
see Monroe, supra note 33. See also U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME (UNODC), MONEY
LAUNDERING AND COVID19: PROFIT AND LOSS (2020), bit.ly/3rlxmLz
[https://perma.cc/QV8R-ZPDQ] (“Traditional cash-courier money laundering has been
significantly reduced through ports and airports. It is unclear if Organized Criminals will
seek alternative remittance methods for their criminal finances, such as cryptocurrencies
or wire transfers, or await the reopening of borders.”).
38
See DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at x.
39
See id. at 29 (explaining that cryptocurrencies are likely to increase in acceptance, yet
right now there are not enough ATM (Automated Teller Machine) kiosks that allow users
to purchase crypto currencies by using cash or debit card).
40
See Goldman et al., supra note 16, at 4.
41
See DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 7.
42
See Michal Lavi, Do Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 484 (2020)
(discussing recent incitement to terrorism on social media and the attacks that followed).
43
DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 9.
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For that reason, the use of cryptocurrencies by terrorists is a major
problem. Curtailing such fundraising is crucial for national security
and public safety.44
When deciding how to combat money laundering and terrorism
financing in traditional financial markets, a consensus emerged (or
rather seemed to exist), that going after the money by stifling terrorist financing, thus crippling their operations, is a key instrument in
the war against terrorism.45 This consensus translates into imposing
duties and obligations on financial institutions46 through anti-money
laundering laws and anti-terrorism statutes.47 Counter terrorism financing (“CTF”) efforts “often focus on tracking the flow of money
through bank accounts and preventing financial transactions that
might be used to support attacks and other terrorist activities.”48
However, terrorists’ increased use of cryptocurrencies could undermine CTF’s efficacy due to cryptocurrencies’ decentralization;49
regulators cannot rely on a central gatekeeper or intermediary to stop
the flow of money for illicit purposes through the blockchain.50
Moreover, some cryptocurrencies allow anonymous transactions.51
44

See id. at xi (“We see little current evidence of the adoption of cryptocurrencies by
terrorist organizations . . . but that very well might change as countermeasures shut off
funding and as the cryptocurrency technology changes.”).
45
See Joseph J. Norton & Heba Shams, Money Laundering Law and Terrorist
Financing: Post-September 11 Responses—Let Us Step Back and Take a Deep Breath?,
36 INT’L LAW. 103, 104 (2002).
46
See id.
47
See generally Olivia G. Chalos, Note, Bank Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act:
The Mental State Requirement Under § 2333(a), 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 303 (2016)
(addressing Section 2333 donor liability cases and the requirement for knowledge that the
consequences were “substantially certain” to result from the donor’s risky conduct, and the
donor deliberately disregarded this fact).
48
See DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at ix.
49
See id.
50
Karen Yeung, Regulation by Blockchain: The Emerging Battle for Supremacy
Between the Code of Law and Code as Law, 83 MOD. L. REV. 207, 214 (2019) (“One
significant advantage of decentralised computer systems is the absence of any ‘single point
of failure[.]’ Although this enhances the resilience of the network’s stability and operation,
it may be less desirable from a conventional law perspective because there is no single
organisational or individual gatekeeper that it can target in order to intervene in their
operation.”).
51
Id. at 210–11 (“Blockchain systems record the allocation of these tokens among
anonymous accounts, automatically recording all exchanges of these tokens between
accounts and automatically updating each copy of the database at each node.”).
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The only truly public feature of the cryptocurrency ledger is the documentation of ownership and transfers.52 The names of the individuals performing transfers are not listed on the ledger.53 Instead, ownership is represented by a set of letters and numbers indicating the
user’s public cryptocurrency address.54 Thus, cryptocurrencies provide terrorists with streams of funding without meaningful tools for
detection and prevention.55 The story of Ali Shukri Amin—who provided instructions over Twitter to use Bitcoin to mask the provision
of funds to ISIS—is just one of many striking examples demonstrating the risks posed by the anonymity surrounding cryptocurrencies.56
An increasing number of regulators are concerned with the use
of cryptocurrencies for illegitimate activities such as terrorism financing, money laundering, and tax evasion.57 In fact, the U.S.
Treasury called to create cryptocurrency rules and new reporting requirements.58 Under the proposed regime:
Cryptocurrency exchanges and custodians would be
required to report more information on the “gross inflows and outflows” of money moving through their
accounts. Businesses would also be required to report cryptocurrency transactions above $10,000
[USD] under the new reporting requirements.59

52

See DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 2.
See id. at 2–3.
54
See id. at 2.
55
See id. at 3.
56
See FATF REPORT, supra note 8, at 36.
57
See, e.g., Council Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L. 156) (EU); Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-283, §§ 6001–6511, 134 Stat. 3388, 4547–633
(2021); Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021).
For more information on tax evasion, see Israel Klein, Contemptuous Tax Reporting, 2019
WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1169–70 (2019) (defines “tax evasion” as “avoiding the payment of
actual tax owed by not complying with the law and by breaching it”).
58
See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE AMERICAN FAMILIES PLAN TAX COMPLIANCE
AGENDA 20–21 (2021), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/The-AmericanFamilies-Plan-Tax-Compliance-Agenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN2E-H2TU].
59
Taylor Hatmaker, US Treasury Calls for Stricter Cryptocurrency Rules, IRS
Reporting for Transfers Over $10K, TECHCRUNCH (May 20, 2021, 2:00 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2021/05/20/new-cryptocurrency-irs-rules-2023-crypto/
[https://perma.cc/RFQ5-ZQ9J].
53
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Following this call, President Joe Biden signed the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act (the “Infrastructure Bill”), on November
15, 2021.60 Accordingly, cryptocurrency asset exchanges and custodians are required to collect information from their customers, and
develop an internal process “to keep track of the holding period and
the buy and sell prices of the digital assets in its customer’s accounts”.61 Companies that currently receive, or may in the future receive large payments in cryptocurrency need to file an IRS form
upon the receipt of more than $10,000 worth of cryptocurrency.62
Passed by Congress in early 2021, the Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 202063 broadens the Bank Secrecy Act’s (“BSA”) definition
of “financial institution” to cover businesses that exchange cryptocurrencies.64 Accordingly, exchanges must verify the identities of
their consumers, develop customer risk profiles, and monitor transactions to submit suspicious activity reports (“SAR”) to the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”).65
60

Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021).
Timothy L. Jacobs et al., New Cryptocurrency Information Reporting Regime
Required on Form 1099 and Form 8300, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec 13, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-cryptocurrency-information-reportingregime-required-form-1099-and-form-8300 [https://perma.cc/7MAU-WTXL].
62
Id.
63
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-283, §§ 6001–6511, 134 Stat.
3388, 4547–633 (2021).
64
See, e.g., Jodi L. Avergun et al., The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020: New
Challenges for Financial Institutions, Their Employees and Customers, and (Nearly)
Everyone Else, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 15, 2022), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/antimoney-laundering-act-2020-new-challenges-financial-institutions-their-employees
[https://perma.cc/WJE4-M2JC]; Morgan Harrison & Theresa Kananen, Anti-Money
Laundering Act Expands Regulation of Cryptocurrency and Other Digital Assets, JD
SUPRA (May 20, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/anti-money-laundering-actexpands-8737757/ [https://perma.cc/VN6T-KEWF] (“Section 5312 of the BSA
(‘Definitions and application’) has been amended so that the definition of ‘financial
institution’ includes ‘a business in the exchange of currency, funds, or value that substitutes
for currency or funds’ and ‘a licensed sender of money or any other person who engages
as a business in the transmission of currency, funds, or value that substitutes for
currency.’”); Andres Fernandez & Eddie A. Jauregui, Key Provisions of the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2020, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.hklaw.com/
en/insights/publications/2021/01/key-provisions-of-the-anti-money-laundering-act-of2020 [https://perma.cc/LBF5-2DK8].
65
31 C.F.R. § 1010.230 (2020). See also Katherine Kirkpatrick et al., The Anti-Money
Laundering Act and Crypto Collide: Non-Fungible Tokens, KING & SPALDING (May 18,
2021), kslaw.com/news-and-insights/the-anti-money-laundering-act-and-crypto-collide61
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To combat cryptocurrency use for illegal purposes, the European
Union recently amended its Anti-Money Laundering Directive. The
new Directive mandates cryptocurrency exchanges and custodian
crypto-wallet providers to follow the same regulatory requirements
as banks and other financial institutions.66 In contrast to the United
States and European Union, which strive to better understand cryptocurrencies in order to establish coherent regulatory policies, other
countries, such as China67 and South Korea, have taken a more extreme approach to mitigate concerns of fraud, money-laundering,
and investor deception; they prohibit Initial Coin Offerings
(“ICOs”) altogether.68
This Article proposes that the token holders’ identities be registered with corporations issuing the tokens prior to allowing an individual to get hold of the token; doing so will decrease future viability
of cryptocurrencies for terrorists and other illicit users, cutting off
the oxygen that enables their activities. Furthermore, the user-accessible registry should remain anonymized and court warrants should
be required before unmasking the identities of token-holders. This
Article is structured as follows:
Part I presents an overview of intermediaries’ role as the new
gatekeepers of users’ illegal activities. It addresses conventional
regulations on financial intermediaries to combat transfers of money
for illicit purposes. It explains that the twenty-first century has created a pluralistic model—a new school of regulation—with many
different actors. This model can be condensed into a triangle of actors: the state, infrastructures that facilitate violations of law, and the
violators.69 Examples of such regulations will be provided. Part I

non-fungible-tokens [https://perma.cc/46QP-CPJT] (discussing reporting obligations
under the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020); Will Kenton, Suspicious Activity Report
(SAR),
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/suspicious-activityreport.asp [https://perma.cc/TG7T-BSZZ] (Jan 25, 2022).
66
See generally Council Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156) ¶ 44 (EU).
67
See China Widens Ban on Crypto Transactions; Bitcoin Tumbles, BLOOMBERG (Sept.
24, 2021, 5:40 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-24/china-deemsall-crypto-related-transactions-illegal-in-crackdown [https://perma.cc/AP6H-3LQK].
68
See Hadar Y. Jabotinsky, The Regulation of Cryptocurrencies: Between a Currency
and a Financial Product, 31 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 118, 120 (2020).
69
See generally Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011
(2018) (in the related context of regulation of speech).

2022]

SPEAK OUT

531

concludes with a description of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism regulations that apply to traditional financial gatekeepers.
Part II explores the features of cryptocurrencies and, even more
relevantly, the features of the blockchains on which they are registered, focusing on the most commonly used blockchains, namely
those of Bitcoin and Ethereum. This Part explains that, due to the
blockchain’s decentralized structure and the anonymity of token
holders, transactions made on the blockchain cannot be regulated.
Anonymous blockchain transactions facilitate the use of these tokens by terrorists. Without meaningful regulation of illicit transactions, terrorism can flourish and threaten both national security and
public safety.
Part III proposes to mitigate the problem by registering and verifying the identities behind token owners. This is also known as permissioned (private) blockchains, such as the one intended for Facebook’s new cryptocurrency, the Diem (previously Libra).70 On such
a blockchain, an access control layer is added to govern who can
access the network.71 Token holder access is then vetted by the network owner.72 Our suggested regulatory solution would allow unmasking the token owner’s identity only where there is probable
cause and would be subject to a court warrant. Therefore, such regulatory change would be in line with the Fourth Amendment, even
after the Supreme Court’s Carpenter v. United States opinion narrowing the third-party doctrine.73 Imposing such obligations on
70

See DIEM ASS’N, LIBRA WHITE PAPER V2.0 (2020), https://www.diem.com/enus/white-paper/#cover-letter [https://perma.cc/GN8S-LKCC].
71
See Anisha Mirchandani, Note, The GDPR-Blockchain Paradox: Exempting
Permissioned Blockchains from the GDPR, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
1201, 1211 (2019); Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., The Distributed Liability of Distributed
Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1372 (2018); Jake
Frankenfield, Permissioned Blockchain, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/p/permissioned-blockchains.asp [https://perma.cc/X33V-95TK] (Jan. 24, 2022)
(“Administrators maintain an access control layer to allow certain actions to be performed
only by certain identifiable participants.”).
72
Mirchandani, supra note 71, at 1211 (“While a public blockchain requires a majority
of all nodes, or participants, to determine whether a transaction or block is verified, a
consortium blockchain is a permissioned blockchain that allows only specific, pre-selected
nodes to determine whether a block is verified.”).
73
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210–11 (2018). See also Paul Ohm, The
Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 358, 385 (2019) (explaining
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companies issuing cryptocurrencies is just and efficient because the
companies benefit commercially from the use of their financial
products. The benefits of maintaining a registrar of token holders
would exceed the obligated companies’ costs and have potential to
curb terrorism financing at this crucial juncture.
Part IV addresses objections to the proposed solution. Inter alia,
this Part addresses First Amendment freedom of expression concerns, as well as considerations such as usability, administrative
costs, data security, and enforcement methods. No law reform proposal is free from externalities and vices. While these concerns are
duly noted, this Part argues that the costs and risks of verifying and
unmasking cryptocurrency identities are justified and consistent
with constitutional basics.
I. INTERMEDIARIES AS GATEKEEPERS: TRADITIONAL
INTERMEDIARY REGULATION FOR COMBATING VIOLATIONS OF LAW
At a basic level, traditional, or “old-school,” regulations impose
imprisonment or fines to regulate and decrease violations of law.74
This type of traditional regulation can be labeled “dualist” or “dyadic.”75 In this model, there are essentially two players: the state and
the violator.76 However, in the twenty-first century, there are multiple players, necessitating a pluralist model. Companies at the center
of the economy provide infrastructure that facilitates both legal and
illegal activities.77 Policymakers have enlisted entities such as
online intermediaries, technology firms, financial intermediaries,
and payment processing intermediaries to regulate activities they facilitate.78 Such regulations can be within the context of

how Carpenter alone presents a fundamental change to Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Carpenter requires a warrant in many situations where none was required before.).
74
See Lavi, supra note 42, at 505 (quoting Balkin, supra note 69, at 2015).
75
See Balkin, supra note 69, at 2013 (referring to a related context of speech regulation).
76
See id.
77
For example, big tech such as internet intermediaries and financial institutions.
78
See Balkin, supra note 69, at 2016 (“Although nation-states continue to regulate
speech directly through old-school methods, they increasingly depend on new-school
speech regulation—attempting to coerce or co-opt private owners of digital infrastructure
to regulate the speech of private actors.”).
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administrative law.79 Yet, in many cases, the obligation to regulate
that is imposed on companies providing infrastructure falls within
the bounds of civil and criminal law.80 Professor Balkin dubbed this
type of enforcement “the new-school regulation.”81 Balkin focused
on the role this model plays in regulating speech through companies
that provide infrastructures such as internet service providers
(“ISPs”), websites that host content (“content providers”), and even
search engines.82 Yet, the same structure is used to deter and enforce
other violations of law. This model includes many different players,
but can be condensed into a triangle of actors: the state, the law violator, and the infrastructure, which serves as a gatekeeper.
Violations of law are often committed under a cloak of anonymity and in jurisdictions without effective rules of law.83 Such violations pose a challenge to law enforcement. In order to cope with this
challenge and mitigate harm caused by violators, enforcement relies
79

See Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106
VA. L. REV. 467, 467–68 (2020) (referring to the rise of the enforcer-firm regulation that
gives a prominent role to the administrative state’s newest gatekeepers). See also Rory Van
Loo, The Revival of Respondeat Superior and Evolution of Gatekeeper Liability, 109 GEO.
L.J. 141, 172 (2020) (“[T]he new gatekeeper governance paradigm is propelling some
businesses into higher control relationships, thereby making it more likely courts will see
them as principals under the common law.”). For a similar argument in the context of
privacy law, see ARI EZRA WALDMAN, INDUSTRY UNBOUND: THE INSIDE STORY OF
PRIVACY, DATA AND CORPORATE POWER 106 (2021) (explaining that privacy law tactic
changed from self-regulation to public-private partnership in the development of
enforcement of law).
80
Thomas E. Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEX. L. REV. 951, 958 (2021) (for an
example in the context of applying Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) by platform
owners); see also id. at 954–55 (“Under cyber-trespass laws like the CFAA, some courts
have treated platforms as digital gatekeepers—as property owners that may permit and
restrict access to their websites much like landowners may do with private land in the real
world.”); WALDMAN, supra note 79.
81
See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2296, 2298–99 (2014) (focusing on this model’s role in regulating speech, Balkin explains
that states attempt to regulate, coerce, or co-opt key players that shape the internet in order
to get their infrastructure to surveil, police, and control speakers).
82
See id. at 2306. For another example of “new-school” speech-regulation methods, see
also Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014) (European Union case involving the right to be
forgotten). See also Michal Lavi, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly Behavior, 40 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2597, 2630–35 (2019).
83
See Aniket Kesari et al., Deterring Cyber Crime: Focus on Intermediaries, 32
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1093, 1130–31 (2017).
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heavily on intermediaries that provide the infrastructure for such activities to occur.84 Accordingly, when an enforcer investigates and
intervenes, “legal demands may fall upon third parties, individuals,
and businesses that were merely used as conduits by the suspect.”85
Imposing legal obligations and liability on the infrastructures for
third-party violations of law is a powerful incentive to mitigate
harm, as it ensures the cooperation of companies with law enforcers
and incentivizes them to operate safely.86
As companies that provide infrastructure are also located at a
highly visible choke point for regulatory intervention, it seems natural to obligate them to supervise and regulate their users’ activities
on the platforms. One prominent example is using online intermediaries to regulate and remedy harmful speech.87 Although U.S. law
allows intermediaries to benefit from overall immunity for content
published by others,88 they are encouraged to mitigate the harm of
harmful content voluntarily, or in the shadow of potential regulation.89 Such cooperation solves structural constraints under constitutional law, as platforms are not state actors and are not constrained
by the First Amendment,90 so government agencies are relatively
free to enlist private actors as cooperators which enables them to do
things they would otherwise be constitutionally forbidden from

84

See id. at 1131.
See id. at 1096.
86
Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, supra note 79,
at 477 (“[I]f the law imposes vicarious liability on the pharmaceutical company for
violations by its ingredient supplier, the pharmaceutical company may be motivated to
audit the supplier’s production process even though auditing is not required.”).
87
See Elena Chachko, National Security by Platform, 25 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 55, 83
(2021).
88
See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also JEFF KOSSEFF, THE
TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET 246 (2019); Michal Lavi, Content
Providers’ Secondary Liability: A Social Network Perspective, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 855, 867–70 (2016). See generally Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is
Better than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 33 (2019).
89
Chachko, supra note 87, at 128 (referring to “government threats in nudging platforms
to step up their contribution to national security, lest they face unwanted adverse
regulation.”).
90
Id. at 106 (referring specifically to platforms role in removing content that impairs
national security and defining this policy as “national security by platforms as
privatization”).
85
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doing.91 Moreover, in many countries outside the United States, intermediaries can be held responsible for failing to remove speech
inciting terrorism,92 hate speech,93 defamation,94 and even fake
news.95

91

See NEIL RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS 139 (2021).
See Lavi, supra note 42, at 506–07. See also Mark Leiser & Edina Harbinja, Why the
United Kingdom’s Proposal for a “Package of Platform Safety Measures” Will Harm Free
Speech, 2020 TECH. & REG. 78, 82 (2020). For criticism, see Danielle Keats Citron,
Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1035, 1043–45 (2018). It should be noted that recently, the European Union outlined a
regulation regarding terrorist content online that requires platforms to take down terrorist
content quickly and “adopt more proactive measures to prevent the spread of terrorist
content in the first place.” Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Content Moderation as Surveillance, 36
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 13) (referring to Regulation (EU)
2021/784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 on addressing
the dissemination of terrorist content online (“TERREG”)).
93
In fall 2017, the German government drafted the Network Enforcement Act
(“NetzDG”) for accommodating hate speech and fake news. The Act applies to criminally
offensive speech as defined in the German Penal Code, including defamation. It stipulates
a differential timeframe for intermediaries to remove harmful content. Intermediaries have
to make sure that they delete content that appears evidently unlawful within twenty-four
hours of filing of a complaint. See Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in
Sozialen Netzwerken [NetzDG] [Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social
Networks], Oct. 1, 2017, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I], at § 3(2)(4) (Ger.);
Wolfgang Schulz, Regulating Intermediaries to Protect Privacy Online—the Case of the
German NetzDG, in PERSONALITY AND DATA PROTECTION RIGHTS ON THE INTERNET 5–6
(forthcoming). See also Meg Leta Jones, Silencing Bad Bots: Global, Legal and Political
Questions for Mean Machine Communication, 23 COMMC’N. L. & POL’Y 159, 177 (2018);
Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 26, 45 (2019) (discussing the adoption of codes of conduct against hate speech by
major online corporations to meet the standards proposed by the UN).
94
See, e.g., Delfi AS v. Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, ¶¶ 114–15 (June 16, 2015),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-126635 (The European Court of Human Rights held
the popular Delfi news website accountable for defamatory statements about a famous
Estonian business executive. Following an article about the executive’s business ventures,
anonymous users posted in the comments section, including personal threats and offensive
language. The Court held Delfi responsible even though it removed the comments upon
knowledge). See also Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ir. Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821 (Oct. 3, 2019) (the Court of Justice of the European Union held that
law does not preclude intermediaries such as Facebook from being ordered to remove
identical and, in certain circumstances, equivalent comments previously declared
unlawful).
95
For example, Singapore allows the government to order intermediaries to remove
false statements. Bill No. 10/2019 Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation
Bill, bit.ly/30hacIC [https://perma.cc/B9XA-ZHMG]. Part four of the law refers to
directions to internet intermediaries and providers of mass media services. See also Jason
92
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In a related context, copyright owners turn to online intermediaries to mitigate copyright infringements and to enforce their intellectual property (“IP”) rights.96 In such cases, intermediaries may
benefit from a legal safe haven if certain steps are taken, such as
responding to takedown requests by IP rights holders.97 However, a
platform’s failure to comply may render it vicariously liable for copyright infringements, in case the content is infringing on IP rights.98
A third example is payment systems and networks for banks and
merchants, such as Visa or Mastercard, which are paid to process
consumer purchases.99 Such payment processing intermediaries attempt to enforce IP rights and mitigate violations of law by “following the money” flowing to online merchants who profit from illegal

Luger, Planetary Illiberalism and the Cybercity-State: In and Beyond Territory, in
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE 1–2 (2019); Niharika Mandhana & Phred Dvorak,
Ordered by Singapore, Facebook Posts a Correction, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2019 7:15
AM), on.wsj.com/2L9FU4P [https://perma.cc/P5T9-DDGU]. For further information on
anti-fake news laws, see The Rise of “Fake News” Laws Across South East Asia, PUB.
MEDIA ALL. (Dec. 6, 2019), bit.ly/2Xbl3TO [https://perma.cc/NL4L-UNSR] (providing an
overview on fake news laws across Southeast Asia, with a focus on media freedom).
96
JACQUELINE LIPTON, RETHINKING CYBERLAW—A NEW VISION FOR INTERNET LAW 66
(2015).
97
See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 512; see also
Kesari et al., supra note 83, at 1095–96; Directive (EU) 2000/31/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information
Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, art. 14(1),
2000 O.J. (L 178). It should be noted that the EU imposes obligations on intermediaries
regarding copyright infringement beyond a notice and takedown regime. See Directive
(EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives
96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, art. 17, 2019 O.J. (L 130). Moreover, a proposed regulation to
amend the Electronic Commerce directive, attempts to impose more obligations on
intermediaries to assist enforcement of violations of rights. See Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services
(Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, at 44–45, COM (2020) 825
final (Dec. 15, 2020).
98
See Zoe Carpou, Note, Robots, Pirates, and the Rise of the Automated Takedown
Regime: Using the DMCA to Fight Piracy and Protect End-Users, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
551, 565 (2016) (“The ISPs themselves face limited resources and the ever-present risk of
losing safe harbor protection if they fail to ‘expeditiously’ remove content pursuant to
takedown requests.”).
99
Kesari et al., supra note 83, at 1126–27 (“Visa, like MasterCard, is a payment
network, an ISP-like entity for banks and merchants that exchange money in order to
process consumer purchases.”).
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activities such as piracy and counterfeiting.100 Creating a payment
blockade seriously threatens the website’s continued existence and,
thus, is effective in preventing the unwanted behavior.101 Blocking
payment-by-payment processing systems is voluntary.102 However,
these practices are “not in the shadow of existing law, but in the
shadow of potential law,” such as legislative bills aimed at payment
processors.103 Moreover, litigation costs and potential legal liability
can also motivate payment processors to block payments from
reaching entities that profit from illegal activities.104
Another function of payment intermediaries is monitoring suspicious activities performed by the same merchants across different
banks. For example, Visa can search for potential infringements in
its payment systems, respond to complaints, investigate or instruct
the payment company to investigate the merchant, and create a report within five business days.105 After reviewing the report, Visa
instructs the payment company to send a “comply or terminate” notice to the suspected infringer.106 Acting as a checkpoint in the marketplace, payment systems can place the flow of revenues and funding of illicit actors under siege and disrupt their activities to avoid
potential regulation.

100

Annemarie Bridy, Internet Payment Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1523, 1523 (2016).
See id. at 1525–27.
102 Id. at 1528–29.
103 Id. at 1528 (intermediaries tend to coalesce around voluntary enforcement agreements
“not in the shadow of existing law, but in the shadow of potential law”) (quoting Ronald J.
Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
239, 260 n.59(2005)). For example, the bills COICA, SOPA, and PIPA all aim to prevent
services from completing payment transactions involving customers located within the
United States, and target the internet site associated with the [targeted] domain name. Such
legislative bills influence intermediaries to block entities that profit from illicit activities.
Combating Online Infringements and Counterfeits Act (COICA), S. 3804, 111th Cong.
(2010); Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Protect
Intellectual Property Act (PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
104 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 798 n.9 (9th Cir.
2007) (dismissing a case in which Perfect 10 sued Visa, MasterCard, and other payment
intermediaries (collectively, “Visa”) on the theory that they were contributorily and
vicariously liable for infringements occurring on so called Stolen Content Websites to
which Visa provided payment processing services; Judge Kozinski dissented).
105 Kesari et al., supra note 83, at 1127.
106
Id. at 1127.
101
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Beyond the context of online speech and IP infringements, intermediaries can suspend or terminate the flow of money.107 Because of this, traditional financial institutions have aided enforcement of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism statutes for many
years.108 The Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), the global organization combating money laundering and terrorist financing, was
formed in 1989 by the “G-7”—a group of seven developed countries.109 The FATF sets international standards aiming to prevent
money laundering and terrorism financing. It also works to generate
the political will to lead countries toward adopting legislative and
regulatory reforms in this area. 110 The FATF’s recommendations
are then adopted into local legislation by all the jurisdictions complying with the recommendations. Jurisdictions that do not comply
are put on a blacklist of non-cooperative states, which flags states
that do not comply with it.111 As a result, financial institutions in
compliant states are likelier to refrain from doing business or interacting with financial institutions or individuals from noncompliant
states.112

107

LUCA BELLI ET AL., PLATFORM REGULATIONS: HOW PLATFORMS ARE REGULATED AND
HOW THEY REGULATE US 220 (2017).
108 See Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 W
ASH. & LEE
L. REV. 797, 836, 846 (2016).
109
See History of the FATF, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, www.fatf-gafi.org/about/
historyofthefatf/ [https://perma.cc/P9PS-ZAFK]. See also James Thuo Gathii, The
Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law, 2010 J. PRO. LAW. 197, 197
(2010).
110 See Gathii, supra note 109, at 200 (“To complement this standard-setting role, the
FATF seeks to ensure effective compliance of its standards. It does so by recommending
its anti-money laundering policies and laws to its members and non-members and by
generating the ‘political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms.’”).
111 About the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative, FIN. ACTION
TASK
FORCE,
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperative
jurisdictions/more/aboutthenon-cooperativecountriesandterritoriesncctinitiative.html?hf=
10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate) [https://perma.cc/9VVZ-ETAT].
112
See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin & Hadar Y. Jabotinsky, Sanction Me If You
Can—the Law and Economics of Blacklisting (2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors).
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A. The Infrastructure as a Gatekeeper of Illegal Money Transfers
for Terrorist Activity
Terrorists need funding for their activities. With greater funding,
they can organize and execute more frequent and lethal attacks.113
As money is usually transferred via a financial intermediary, financial institutions are infrastructures that, unwittingly, facilitate the
transfer of money for terrorism.114 Due to this feature, financial institutions—such as banks and wire services—have the ability to
deny services, making it difficult for terrorists to receive and transfer
money.115 If terrorists are prevented from easily receiving donations
and funding, the oxygen for their activities is cut off. Financial transfer chokepoints present an opportunity to slow money transfers for
terrorist operations, disrupt their activities, and block them from perpetrating illicit acts.116
In light of the abovementioned characteristics of financial intermediaries, law enforcement agencies have developed and implemented several successful approaches to prevent the flow of funding
to terrorist organizations and other criminals through financial intermediaries.117 Federal law places responsibilities on financial institutions to prevent donations and payments for terrorism.118 For example, “when an enforcer investigates and makes interventions,” the
responsibility to make legal demands may instead fall upon financial
intermediaries and businesses “that were merely used as conduits by

113

See DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 1 (citing ARABINDA ACHARYA,
TARGETING TERRORIST FINANCING: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND NEW REGIMES
(2009)).
114 Paul Schott Stevens & Thomas C. Bogle, Patriotic Acts: Financial Institutions,
Money Laundering and the War Against Terrorism, 21 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 261, 283–
85 (2002).
115
Stephen I. Landman, Bank Liability Under the Anti-Terrorism Act: Dispelling the
“Routine Banking Services” Defense in Material Support Cases, at 15–16, 24 (Dec. 9,
2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1314104 [https://perma.cc/YA5X-8M7M].
116 See Kesari et al., supra note 83, at 1106.
117
See, e.g., DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at ix (discussing Counter Terrorism
Financing (“CTF”)). For further information on CTF, see supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
118 See John J. Byrne, Banks and the USA Patriot Act, 9 E
CON. PERSPS. 18, 18–21 (Sept.
2004).
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the suspect.”119 Assigning responsibility to the financial institutions
incentivizes these intermediaries to take measures to combat money
laundering activities on their platforms (whether the money is transferred through bank accounts or other tools).120 In addition to impacting terrorist fundraising, “this increased enforcement has significantly reduced the ability of terrorist groups to rely on formal banking,” especially money management and transfer services, which is
“an expansive category that can include digital transfers, prepaid instruments, and mobile payment systems.”121 The anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism statutes serve as primary examples of gatekeeping obligations and financial institution liability. The following
Subsections focus on these existing CTF regulatory solutions and
expand upon main gatekeeping obligations.
1. Traditional Financial Intermediaries at the Service of
National Security
a) Anti-Money Laundering Statutes
Money laundering is a process in which individuals who obtain
money through criminal activity (including terrorism) try to conceal
the illegal source of income and make it appear legitimate.122 Money
laundering is a systemic problem that greatly impacts the world’s
economy.123 Money laundering activities are typically comprised of
three stages: (1) placement—introducing money into the financial
system; (2) layering—masking the origin through multiple, separate
transactions; and (3) integration—integrating the illegal proceeds
from the crime into the legitimate financial system.124 Anti-money
119

See Kesari et al., supra note 83, at 1096.
See Amanda Bloch Kernan, Sustaining the Growth of Mobile Money Services in
Developing Nations: Lessons from Overregulation in the United States, 51 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1109, 1141, 1143 (2018).
121 See D
ION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 10 (referencing 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010, 1021,
1022 (2021)).
122 See generally Duncan E. Alford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on
Financial Institutions, 19 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 437 (1994).
123
“[T]he United Nations recently estimated that the criminal proceeds laundered
annually between [two] and [five] percent of global GDP, or $1.6 to $4 trillion a year.”
Rhoda Weeks-Brown, Straight Talk: Cleaning Up, INT’L MONETARY FUND, Dec. 2018, at
44.
124
Alford, supra note 122, at 439.
120
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laundering regulations try to catch and prevent the latter two steps—
layering and integration.
Although anti-money laundering regulation has existed in most
developed countries since the 1970s,125 Western governments have
significantly increased the enforcement of these regulations since
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (“9/11”). After 9/11, a consensus emerged, “that going after the terrorist money is a key instrument in this war against terrorism.”126 This notion translated into
more “duties and obligations on financial institutions around the
world.”127 Thus, anti-money laundering has become a core element
in combating terrorist activities and related crimes “and a central
precept to international banking standards.”128
The executive branch and Congress took action, and the United
States was quick to adopt further measures against money laundering.129 The result was the enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act, referred to as the USA PATRIOT
Act,130 (“the Patriot Act”),131 which calls upon every American patriot to play his or her part in defending against the threat of terrorism.132 The purpose of the Patriot Act is “[t]o deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law
125

In 1970, Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act requiring financial institutions to
report to the government on cash transactions exceeding USD 10,000. See 31 U.S.C. §§
5311, 5413; 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2021). In 1996, federal regulations began requiring
banks to report suspicious activities. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 21.11, 163.180 (2021).
126 See Norton & Shams, supra note 45, at 104. See also Goldman et al., supra note 16,
at 4 (noting that “‘following the money’ has been a particularly effective component of an
overall strategy to degrade the capabilities of terrorist groups.”).
127 Norton & Shams, supra note 45, at 104.
128
See id. at 105.
129 See id. at 104. See also Chalos, supra note 47, at 317 (referencing 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(2), which “prohibits the transportation, transmission, or transfer of funds from a
place inside the United States to a place outside the United States ‘with the intent to
promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.’” The statue “criminalizes ‘reverse’
money laundering, or the movement of ‘clean’ money overseas for an illicit purpose.”).
130 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act creates an acronym (“USA PATRIOT”). Norton &
Shams, supra note 45, at 104.
131
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). See Norton & Shams,
supra note 45, at 104.
132
Norton & Shams, supra note 45, at 104.
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enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.”133 The Patriot Act enhances the partnership between the public and private
sectors in policing the channels of international financial transfers134
and applies to foreign financial institutions and foreigners not residing within U.S. jurisdictions.135 The Patriot Act requires financial
institutions—the gateways—to serve as the first line of defense
against illicit activity in the financial system.136 These institutions
are charged with blocking any movement of money transmitted
through their systems that is generated from crime or designated for
terrorism.137 They are also supposed to “know their clients,” by
completing a Know Your Client (“KYC”) questionnaire that acquaints the institution with a client’s account activities; doing so
helps avert criminals and terrorists.138 This should be accomplished
by “adopting broader risk management approaches that will make it
harder for abuse to [occur] in the first place.”139
Title III of the Patriot Act—the International Money Laundering
Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001140—relates to
the global issues of money laundering. Anti-money laundering statutes focus on specific areas of banking obligations.141 As mentioned
above, the provisions obligate financial intermediaries to know their

133

Id. at 107–08.
See id. at 116.
135
See id. at 108.
136 See David A. Andelman, The Drug Money Maze, F
OREIGN AFFS., July–Aug. 1994, at
94,102–03.
137 See Goldman et al., supra note 16, at 30 (“These statutes require financial institutions,
the gateways, to be the first line of defense against illicit activity moving around the
financial system. They are charged with blocking the movement of dirty money that transits
their systems and keeping out bad actors, and with adopting broader risk management
approaches that will make it harder for abuse to take place in the first place.”).
138 See 12 U.S.C. § 635(i); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.200 et seq. (2016); Kesari et al., supra note
83, at 1096; Bridy, supra note 100, at 1565; Norton & Shams, supra note 45, at 106, 121
(“[F]inancial institutions are required to consult the list of suspected terrorists and terrorist
organizations provided by ‘any government agency’ (emphasis added) to determine
whether a potential customer appears on the list. This could result in an enormous
regulatory burden that is too soon to assess. The financial institutions are already aware of
problems imposed by the variations in spelling of Arabic names.”).
139 See Goldman et al., supra note 16, at 30.
140
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, 115 Stat. 272, 296–342 (2001). See Norton & Shams,
supra note 45, at 104.
141
See Norton & Shams, supra note 45, at 106.
134
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customers and require that ordinary users provide documentation of
their identity.142 A second area of obligation concerns due diligence,
as it relates to private banking activities and supply of credit.143Additional obligations relate to reviewing relationships with non-U.S.
correspondent banks and shell banks, and monitoring wire transfers
for patterns of money laundering activities.144 Such requirements
can create blockades of illegal transfers and thus allow tracking,
monitoring, and confiscation of such transfers.145 Banks are supposed to report unusual activities in their customers’ accounts, as
well as specific transactions dictated by the laws and regulations.146
Obviously, complying with anti-money laundering requirements
places a heavy regulatory burden on financial institutions—especially since failure to comply can result in liability.147
The United States supplements this regulatory framework with
three criminal laws: two laws prohibiting money laundering,148 both
relating to the prohibition against financial transfers relating to proceeds from unlawful activities; and one law prohibiting the restructuring of financial transactions to avoid reporting.149
i.
Money Laundering and Comingled Bank Accounts in
Court Rulings
Comingling funds within bank accounts is another issue that perpetuates illegal activities, such as funding terrorism and other financial crimes.150 Though the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue, lower courts provide a spectrum of opinions on the matter.151 In
142

See Robert M. Taylor II, Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing
Requirements Applicable to Financial Institutions, 120 BANKING L.J. 497, 499 (2003).
143
Id. at 501.
144 See Norton & Shams, supra note 45, at 106.
145
Id. at 106, 117–21.
146 Id. at 109.
147
See id. at 122.
148 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957.
149 31 U.S.C. § 5324.
150 See Rachel May Zysk & Eddie Suarez, Proving Money Laundering Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt: The Problem of Commingled Property Under 18 USC § 1957,
CHAMPION, May 2017, at 34, 35.
151 See, e.g., United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102, 115 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 738 (2018); United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 792 (7th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Pizano, 421 F.3d 707, 723 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Loe, 248 F.3d 449,
467 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 357 (5th Cir. 2000); United
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United States v. Moore, the Fourth Circuit ruled that because legal
funds cannot be distinguished from illegal funds in the same bank
account, all funds in an account engaged in criminal activity are to
be considered proceeds of that criminal activity.152 A similar approach is taken by other circuit courts,153 but not by all. For example,
the Ninth Circuit demands proof that the funds are the proceeds of
criminal activity,154 and the Fifth Circuit has a presumption that
“clean money” is spent before dirty money.155
Usually, due to specific clauses in the deposit insurance contract,
banks are able to freeze accounts with commingled funds if they detect suspicious activity in the account.156 Courts may also freeze
property that was obtained as a result of money laundering activity.157 However, in Luis v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that freezing an account containing comingled funds violated the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.158 Dissenting, Justices Kennedy and Alito opined that it is impossible to
tell if a defendant spent the legal funds in the account first or if the
illegal funds are fungible.159 However, as mentioned above, the
overarching issue remains unresolved, as the Supreme Court has yet
to address it.

States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1292 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d
396, 409 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 976–77 (4th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 570 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Jackson,
935 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1991); See also Sarah Scharf, The Question of Commingled
Funds in the Criminal Prosecution of Individuals for Money Laundering (2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
152
Moore, 27 F.3d at 976–77.
153
Such an approach has been adopted by the Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits. See Silver, 864 F.3d at 115; Sokolow, 91 F.3d at 409; Jackson, 935 F.2d at 840;
Pizano, 421 F.3d at 723; Johnson, 971 F.2d at 570. See also Scharf, supra note 151, at 2.
154 Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1292.
155
Davis, 226 F.3d at 357 (“[W]hen the aggregate amount withdrawn from an account
containing commingled funds exceeds the clean funds, individual withdrawals may be said
to be of tainted money, even if a particular withdrawal was less than the amount of clean
money in the account.”). See Loe, 248 F.3d at 467; Scharf, supra note 151, at 2.
156 See, e.g., Deposit Agreement & Disclosures, COMMERCE BANK (June 15, 2020),
www.commercebank.com/personal/bank/deposit-agreement
[https://perma.cc/YZ77AEGN]. See also Scharf, supra note 151, at 2.
157
18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(2).
158 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1087 (2016) (plurality opinion).
159
See id. at 1109 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Scharf, supra note 151, at 3.
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b) Anti-Terror Statutes: Material Support and the
Criminalization of Financing of Terrorism
Financial institutions play an important role in efforts to cut off
financial support for terrorist organizations.160 Anti-terror statutes
codify the Patriot Act161 by prohibiting the provision of material
support for terrorism and exposing financial institutions to ex-post
civil and criminal liability for facilitating money transfers to terrorist
organizations.162 18 U.S.C. Section 2339A prohibits providing “material support or resources . . . knowing or intending that they are to
be used in preparation for, or in carrying out” a violation of certain
offenses, including terror.163 Section 2339C addresses the collection
of funds.164 It imposes penal sanctions against the provision or collection of funds “with the intention that such funds be used, or with
the knowledge that such funds are to be used, in full or in part, in
order to carry out” a statutorily enumerated predicate crime.165
Unlike Sections 2339A and 2339C, Section 2339B does not require knowledge, intent, or specific intent mens rea166 to fund
160

The main Anti-Terror Statutes are 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which “outlaws providing
material support for the commission of certain designated offenses that might be committed
by terrorists,” and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which “outlaws providing material support to certain
designated terrorist organizations.” CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41333,
TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT: AN OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. § 2339A AND § 2339B 1
(2016).
161
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
162 See Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives
Derived from the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 5, 10 (2005).
163 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; see also Ronbert H. Schwartz, Comment, Laying the Foundation
for Social Media Prosecutions Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1181, 1184–
86 (2017); Lavi, supra note 42, at 510.
164 Chalos, supra note 47, at 315.
165
18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a).
166 Mens rea is the criminal intent or state of mind of the person committing the crime
that must be proven to convict. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974,
1017 (1932); see also Chalos, supra note 47, at 319–20 (“To violate [Section] 2339A, the
defendant must provide material support or resources ‘knowing or intending’ that they are
used to carry out acts of terrorism. To violate [Section] 2339C, the defendant must have
provided or collected funds with the specific intent or knowledge that the funds were to be
used to ‘carry out’ enumerated predicate offenses related to terrorism . . . .By contrast, to
violate [Section] 2339B, the defendant must only have knowledge that the organization is
a designated FTO or engages or has engaged in acts of terrorism. The defendant is not
required to know or intend that the material support or resources would be used to carry
out a violent crime . . . .Courts hold that the knowledge requirement of [Section] 2339B
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terrorist activities; rather, it prohibits “knowingly provid[ing] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization”
(“FTO”).167 Thus, if a provider, such as a bank or other financial
institution, knows that an organization has been officially designated as a “terror” organization, or if it knows that an organization
engages in terrorism, the financial institution may be found liable,
even without knowing that the funds were to be used to “carry out”
acts of terrorism.168
It is frequently difficult “to separate licit operations and expenses, such as salaries and social services, from clearly illicit
spending, such as terrorism recruitment and training.”169 This is due
to “lack of information about and the close relationship between
these activities.”170 It is especially difficult since legitimate activities help terrorists mask illegal activities.171 For example, operating
costs of terrorism, “such as propaganda, recruitment, salaries, and
social services, indirectly contribute to an organization’s ability to
produce violence.”172 However, Section 2339B applies to any support provided to a terrorist organization.173 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 2339B in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (“HLP”), determining that “the federal government
[has] the authority to prohibit groups from working with terrorist
organizations even when their violent operations [are] interlinked
with more benign functions, such as charity work.”174 Considering
may be satisfied by evidence that a defendant acted with willful blindness regarding the
organization.” (internal citations omitted)).
167 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Chalos, supra note 47, at 314; see also Lavi, supra note 42, at
510–11. FTOs are organizations that the Secretary of State has defined as foreign terrorists.
The list of FTOs maintained by the State Department encompasses sixty-one such groups.
See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
COUNTERTERRORISM, https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/ [https://
perma.cc/PG55-LPS9].
168
See Rachel E. VanLandingham, Jailing the Twitter Bird: Social Media, Material
Support to Terrorism and Muzzling the Modern Press, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4 (2017).
169 See DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 13.
170 See id.
171 See id. (citing ELI BERMAN, RADICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND VIOLENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS
OF TERRORISM (2009)).
172 See id.
173
Chalos, supra note 47, at 320–21.
174 Lavi, supra note 42, at 510 (discussing Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S.
1, 7–9 (2010)).
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the severe harms that can ensue from terrorist organizations, the
Court broadly interpreted “coordination,” and determined that
“working in coordination with or at the command of FTOs serves to
legitimize and further their terrorist means,” finding that these actions materially support terrorist organizations.175
As previously explored in other research, neither Section 2339A
nor 2339B create private, civil causes of action. However, Section
2333 stands in contrast:
[Section 2333] allows private parties who are nationals of the United States to sue in federal district court
and receive treble damages and attorney’s fees if they
were injured in their “person, property, or business
by reason of international terrorism.”176
This requirement “may be satisfied when an entity recognizes it is
supporting a terrorist organization; it needs not be aware that its aid
is going to advance a specific terrorist conspiracy.”177
In the wake of terrorist attacks, victims and their families are left
with a troubling reality: they have little chance of bringing those directly responsible to justice in court.178 Holding those who provide
material support to terrorist groups civilly liable may serve a few
purposes: “(1) it allows victims and their families to hold anyone in
the chain of causation directly accountable, (2) it allows for potentially significant financial recourse, and (3) it encourages banks to
think twice about their role in terrorism’s causal chain.”179 There is
a growing trend to press civil claims against banks.180 However,
even though liability can be imposed on banks for material support,181 courts are deeply divided over whether Section 2333 allows
175

Id. at 510–11 (citing Holder, 561 U.S. at 30–31).
See id. at 511; see also Susan Klein & Crystal Flinn, Social Media Compliance
Programs and the War Against Terrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 53, 85 (2017); Alexander
Tsesis, Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 605,
621 (2017).
177 Tsesis, supra note 176, at 620.
178 See Chalos, supra note 47, at 307.
179
Id. at 305–06 (internal quotations omitted).
180 See id. at 305.
181
See generally Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated
and remanded, 882 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2018) (for a case where the court imposed liability
on a bank for material support. The bank provided funding to Hamas, which used the
176
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for secondary liability based on the theory that a bank aided or abetted an act of terrorism.182 Courts also disagree on the required degree
of fault necessary to assert civil liability under Section 2333(a).183
Thus, despite the potential benefits of Section 2333 claims, the current framework creates inconsistent civil judgments.184
In summary, laws impose obligations and liability on intermediaries to improve the efficiency of policing illegal activities, including terrorist activities. However, such enforcement methods are only
as effective as the way in which courts impose them. The war against
money laundering is ongoing and can only be won if it becomes difficult to circumvent the laws and regulations relating to anti-money
laundering and financing of terrorism. Circumventing traditional intermediaries makes it possible to avoid enforcement for illegal transfers and use funds for terrorist activities. As this Article demonstrates, cryptocurrencies circumvent traditional intermediaries and
means of enforcement, and enable the flow of money to support and
manage terrorist activities.
II. WHAT ARE CRYPTOCURRENCIES, HOW DO THEY WORK, AND
WHAT BENEFITS DO THEY PROVIDE FOR TERRORISTS?
A. Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrencies are electronically generated and stored currencies that enable users to trade objects with one another.185 In 2008,
the first and perhaps most well-known cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, was
introduced to the world by a “white paper.”186 This first white paper,
money for terror attacks between 2000 and 2004. The bank funded several other FTOs in
addition to Hamas). See also Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 571–72
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). It should be noted that in Linde, the bank was more than a financial
institution and actually cooperated with the FTO. Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 584–85.
182 Chalos, supra note 47, at 306–07.
183 Id. at 307.
184 Id. at 308.
185 See Jabotinsky, supra note 68, at 118.
186
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, SATOSHI
NAKAMOTO INST. (Oct. 31, 2008), https://git.dhimmel.com/bitcoin-whitepaper/v/
a5f36b332cb6a5fa9e701886f376ac1ac2946d07/ [https://perma.cc/ZF3H-JVED]; see also
Armin Krishnan, Blockchain Empowers Social Resistance and Terrorism Through
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations, 13 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 41, 42 (2020); Saman
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entitled “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,” was
posted online by an unknown author under the pseudonymous name,
“Satoshi Nakamoto.”187 As the white paper revealed, the Bitcoin
network is both a protocol for securely storing and transmitting tokens (virtual coins) and the name of the system’s unit of value.188 It
further explained that Bitcoin is an encrypted digital token that can
be transferred from one user to the other without requiring a centralized entity to register the transactions.189 Instead, transactions are
recorded in distributed ledger technology (“DLT”), which allows all
users to keep track of the registered transactions.190 As the technology is made out of blocks connecting to each other via an encrypted
digital signature, it is called a “blockchain.”191
The Bitcoin blockchain allows users to transfer Bitcoin tokens
and follow the transfers by providing an open ledger.192 The blockchain is maintained by an online peer-to-peer network—a DLT—
“that tracks transactions and maintains a complete history of verified

Adhami et al., Why Do Businesses Go Crypto? An Empirical Analysis of Initial Coin
Offerings, 100 J. ECON. & BUS. 64, 65 (2018); Roee Sarel, Property Rights in
Cryptocurrencies: A Law and Economics Perspective, 22 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 389, 397–98
(2021).
187
See Nakamoto, supra note 186.
188 See D
ION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 57 (“Bitcoin, which was launched by the
pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto in early 2009, is both a protocol for securely storing and
transmitting tokens (virtual coins) and the name of the unit of value in the system.”).
189 See Sarel, supra note 186.
190 See id.
191
It should be noted that the original Bitcoin White Paper does not use the specific term
blockchain and this term was developed later. See generally Nakamoto, supra note 186.
The White Paper refers to a chain. Id. (“The network timestamps transactions by hashing
them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be
changed without redoing the proof-of-work.”). For overviews and further details on the
blockchain technology, and for a detailed explanation of how it works, see DYLAN YAGA
ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NISTIR 8202:
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW (2018), https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1906/
1906.11078.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUR7-M4A9]; Lin William Cong & Zhiguo He,
Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 1754 (2019). For an
overview of Bitcoin in particular, see generally Christian Rueckert, Cryptocurrencies and
Fundamental Rights, 5 J. CYBERSECURITY, 2019, at 1.
192
See Yan Chen, Blockchain Tokens and the Potential Democratization of
Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 61 BUS. HORIZONS 567, 569 (2018) (“The Bitcoin
blockchain allows users to store and transfer Bitcoins on a peer-to-peer network.”).
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transactions.”193 Accordingly, and true to the nature of a public
blockchain, “[a]ny user of the system can participate in all aspects
of its operations, including all transactions, [but] no single participant has control.”194 To maintain anonymity, “Bitcoin transaction
participants are identified by a unique string of random numbers rather than by a name or other personal information.”195 The same is
true for Ether tokens, another widely-used cryptocurrency that runs
on the Etheruem blockchain.196 The Etheruem blockchain allows users to make use of “smart contracts.”197 Such contracts are basically
computer orders which follow the logic of “if x occurs, do y.”198
Other firms use this blockchain as a template to develop and issue
their own tokens in a process called an Initial Coin Offering

193

See DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at ix; ROBBY HOUBEN & ALEXANDER
SNYERS, CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND BLOCKCHAIN: LEGAL CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
FINANCIAL CRIME, MONEY LAUNDERING AND TAX EVASION 15–16 (2018).
194
See DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 2.
195 See id. It should be noted that Bitcoin provides pseudo-anonymity and not overall
anonymity. See Dmitry Ermilov et al., Automatic Bitcoin Address Clustering, 16TH IEEE
INT’L. CONF. ON MACH. LEARNING & APPLICATIONS 461, 461 (2017) (“Bitcoins owning and
transferring (addresses and transactions) is available as a public ledger called blockchain.
But real-world owners of addresses are not known in general. That’s why Bitcoin is called
pseudo-anonymous. However, some addresses can be grouped by their ownership using
behavior patterns and publicly available information from off-chain sources.”).
196 See Shaanan Cohney & David A. Hoffman, Transactional Scripts in Contract Stacks,
105 MINN. L. REV. 319, 335–36 (2020) (“[A] programmer named Vitalik Buterin proposed
and developed Ethereum, a blockchain based computing platform, with an associated
cryptocurrency, Ether. . . . The protocol’s explicit goal was to permit enhanced scripting—
more complicated logical operations than recording ownership—on a blockchain.”); see
generally Gavin Wood, Ethereum: A Secure Decentralised Generalised Transaction
Ledger (EIP-150 Revision), GAVIN WOOD, http://gavwood.com/Paper.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NFX9-5PJB].
197
Smart Contracts: 10 Use Cases for Business, AMBISAFE, https://ambisafe.com/blog/
smart-contracts-10-use-cases-business/ [https://perma.cc/2LBT-9SMB] (“Smart contracts
do not require any intermediaries. Hence, you pay no fees. As there’s no bureaucracy
involved, transactions become fast and cheap. Moreover, the transparency guaranteed by
the blockchain reduces the possible risks of fraud.”); see also Alexander Savelyev,
Contract Law 2.0: “Smart” Contracts as the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law
16 (Nat’l Rsch. Univ. Higher Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. BRP 71/LAW/2016,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885241 [https://perma.cc/
3H7Z-JCWD]; Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices, GITHUB, bit.ly/3oL4KJW
[https://perma.cc/G9B6-KZZA]; Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 196, at 321 n.9 (“[S]mart
contracts are actually meant to replace legal contracts.”).
198
See Jabotinsky, supra note 68, at 138–39.
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(“ICO”). Anonymity is also maintained for Etheruem blockchain users.199
The most recently popularized cryptocurrency was Facebook’s
initiative: the Diem (previously Libra).200 The Diem project was
meant to launch in 2020, but following regulatory concerns was
abandoned in January 2022.201 Diem—which was supposed to be a
global coin designed to replace some fiat currencies—would have
allowed users to send money or make purchases with almost zero
fees.202 According to plans, to use Diem, users should have downloaded a wallet application such as Novi, the application Facebook
designed for its new currency.203 This application was meant to be
incorporated into WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger,204 and users
of these apps should have formed Diem’s user base.205 This intended
token aimed to allow users to exchange fiat currencies (such as
USD, EUR, etc.) in return for Diem and exchange the tokens back
to fiat currencies when they please.206 The Diem token was
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202 See Jabotinsky, supra note 68, at 146.
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See Pupolizio, supra note 200, at 11 (“The proposed governance arrangements of the
Libra/Diem project are further complicated by the existence of Novi (formerly known as
Calibra), a Facebook subsidiary company designed for creating the digital wallets
necessary to use Libra.”).
204 See Josh Constine, Facebook Announces Libra Cryptocurrency: All You Need to
Know, TECHCRUNCH (June 18, 2019), techcrunch.com/2019/06/18/facebook-libra/ [https://
perma.cc/KQ9W-3ZAX].
205 See John Taskinsoy, This Time Is Different: Facebook’s Libra Can Improve Both
Financial Inclusion and Global Financial Stability as a Viable Alternative Currency to the
U.S. Dollar, 5 J. ACCT., FIN. & AUDITING STUD., no. 5, 2019, at 67, 71 (“With a user base
of close to 3 billion (i.e. Messenger, WhatsApp, Instagram, and Facebook), Facebook’s
Libra is forecasted to dominate daily transactions for goods/services and money transfers
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supposed to be pegged to a basket of short-term government securities and bank deposits to mitigate the fluctuation usually associated
with cryptocurrencies.207
Unlike other cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ether, and most
tokens built on the Ethereum blockchain, Diem was supposed to run
on what is known as a “private blockchain,” which screens participants upon entrance.208 The blockchain designed for Diem was intended to be run by the Diem Association members.209 This means
that the ledger of transactions should have been accessible only to
them and that they would have had control over who enters the system.210 Since Diem was supposed to control the entry point to the
system, this currency initiative was arguably less decentralized relative to other cryptocurrencies.211
ICOs are attractive to entrepreneurs for different reasons, some
more legitimate than others. Legitimate reasons might include the
fact that issuing tokens, as opposed to stocks, enables entrepreneurs
to maintain all of their rights in the corporation without dilution
while still raising money, allowing them to reach more investors
worldwide, and avoiding costly regulatory demands.212 For these
reasons, the market for ICOs bloomed between 2016 and 2019,213
raising over $35 billion (USD) from investors worldwide.214 During
REV., Dec. 2020, at 19, 25 (“Facebook will have to set up some sort of system where people
in those countries can exchange their national fiat currency from and to Diem.”).
207 See Jabotinsky, supra note 68, at 146. Cryptocurrencies which are pegged to other
assets are also known as “stable coins.”
208 See Michele Benedetto Neitz, The Influencers: Facebook’s Libra, Public
Blockchains, and the Ethical Considerations of Centralization, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 41,
44 (2019) (“Private blockchains, also known as permissioned blockchains, limit
participation to specific individuals selected by a particular enterprise.”).
209
The Libra Association (now Diem) is an independent membership organization
responsible for the governance of the Libra network and the development of the Libra
project. See About Us, DIEM ASS’N, libra.org/en-US/association/ [https://perma.cc/9K7S273S].
210 See Neitz, supra note 208, at 44.
211 See Jabotinsky & Sarel, supra note 26, at 24.
212 See Sarel, supra note 186, at 399–400.
213
See id. at 400.
214 Oksana A. Karpenko et al., The Initial Coin Offering (ICO) Process: Regulation and
Risks, 14 J. RISK & FIN. MGMT., 2021, at 5 (“In recent years, a new form of funding—ICOs
has become widespread. ICOs allow an enterprise to raise funding in exchange for
cryptographically secure tokens, which are a means of paying for future projects or
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this time, exchanges designated solely for cryptocurrencies and supplying the market with liquidity began to pop up.215 These exchanges form the marketplace where buyers and sellers of tokens
can conduct exchanges.216
However, alongside legitimate reasons for issuing tokens, there
are illegitimate reasons, including using tokens’ anonymity for
money-laundering,217 fraud, tax evasion,218 Ponzi schemes, and219
terrorist organization funding.220
B. Why and How Are Cryptocurrencies Used by Terrorist
Organizations?
Terrorists require significant funding for their operations, propaganda, recruitment, training, salaries, and management.221 For example, ISIS approved a $2 billion (USD) budget for 2015.222 Costs
of specific attacks range from an estimated $10,000 USD for the
2015 Paris attacks, to $400,000–500,000 USD for the 9/11 attacks.223
Money fuels terrorist activities; the more funding organizations
have, the more they can recruit members, organize schemes, and
commit terror attacks. Terrorist groups’ sources of revenue and
fundraising activities combine traditional and non-traditional methods.224 These organizations depend on numerous sources of income
derived from both criminal activities and legitimate activities that
are abused to generate funds.225 Examples of criminal activities
services. In 2016–2019, over 7400 businesses attempted ICOs, raising a staggering USD
35 billion.”).
215 See Sarel, supra note 186, at 399–400.
216
See id. at 400.
217
See generally Rolf Van Wegberg et al., Bitcoin Money Laundering: Mixed Results?
An Explorative Study on Money Laundering of Cybercrime Proceeds Using Bitcoin, 25 J.
FIN. CRIME 419 (2018).
218 See generally Thomas Slattery, Taking a Bit Out of Crime: Bitcoin and Cross-Border
Tax Evasion, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 829 (2014).
219 S
ECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFF. INV. EDUC. & ADVOCACY, INVESTOR ALERT: PONZI
SCHEMES USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, PUB. NO. 153 (July 1, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/
files/ia_virtualcurrencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB9K-VMQV].
220 See Sarel, supra note 186, at 400–01.
221
See FATF REPORT, supra note 8, at 9–10.
222 See Goldman et al., supra note 16, at 10.
223
Id.
224 Id.
225
Id.
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include arms and drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, extortion,
and racketeering.226 In addition, terrorist organizations and their associates divert funds from charities, donations, sponsorships, and legal sources such as businesses and personal credit loans to terror.227
After generating funds, terrorist organizations must manage
their money.228 If the money received is not yet under the direct control of the terrorist organization, or if it cannot be transferred because of operational security concerns, terrorists may use money
laundering and other transfer mechanisms to support the cash needs
of their members and associates.229 Terrorist groups and organizations spend the money they generate on salaries, services, and their
operations.230
1. The Anonymity of Some Cryptocurrencies and Its
Importance to Terrorist Activities
Cryptocurrencies are attractive to terrorists, as using anonymous
tokens can promote their activities, aid organizational transactions,
allow the collection and management of funds, and ultimately the
use of the funds collected. Such tokens make it possible to transfer
money instantly around the world without using intermediaries,
such as banks, as those facilitate greater transparency and are obligated to report suspicious activity in depositors’ accounts.231 Anonymous cryptocurrencies make it possible to hide and protect the
identity of the user; “[w]hile the original purchase of the currency
may be visible (e.g., through the banking system), all following
transfers . . . are difficult to detect.”232
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Id.
Id.
228 DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 10.
229 Id.
230
Id. at 13.
231 On the duty of financial institutions to report suspicious activities, see Matthew R.
Hall, Note, An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct: Banks, Money Laundering,
and the Suspicious Activity Report, 84 KY. L.J. 643, 653 (1995).
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Admittedly, the anonymity on the blockchain is incomplete233
and perhaps insufficient for some users,234 as the degree of anonymity depends on operational and technical factors, allowing transactions to be de-anonymized through a variety of methods.235 However, such methods of de-anonymization have costs and revealing
identities takes time.236 Moreover, dark wallets, which seek to render de-anonymizing cryptocurrency transactions impossible, disrupt
potentially identifying characteristics on the blockchain, enabling illicit financial transactions.237
Anonymity in financial transactions is an important aspect of
every terrorist’s financial activities. First, anonymity is important
for fundraising.238 Since it is illegal to provide material support to
known terrorist organizations, lack of anonymity serves as a deterrent to donors.239 Likewise, recipients of funds meant for terrorist
operations require anonymity, as being actively involved with raising funds for terrorist organizations or operations is illegal and
would, if unmasked, be blocked by authorities.240 Thus, when cryptocurrencies remain anonymous, it is possible to circumvent the
Western banking system, which limits donations for jihad through
restrictions on the financial system.241 Second, anonymity of financial transactions is critical for illegal drug and arms trafficking.242
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See Paul Carroll & James Windle, Cyber as an Enabler of Terrorism Financing, Now
and in the Future, 13 J. POLICING, INTEL. & COUNTER TERRORISM 285, 288 (2018).
234 See Stephan Breu & Theodor G. Seitz, Legislative Regulations to Prevent Terrorism
and Organized Crime from Using Cryptocurrencies and Its Effect on Economy and Society,
in LEGAL IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY: METHODS, RESULTS, PERSPECTIVES (2018).
235
See DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 25; Smith, supra note 34; Carroll &
Windle, supra note 233, at 288 (“Cryptocurrencies provide increased, rather than complete,
anonymity as they are added to blockchains which can be used to trace the originating
electronic wallet from which the cryptocurrency was sent.”).
236 Cf. Woodrow Hartzog & Ira Rubinstein, The Anonymization Debate Should Be About
Risk, Not Perfection, 60 COMMC’N. ACM, no. 5, May 2017, at 22, 24 (“By focusing on
process instead of output, data release policy can aim to raise the cost of re-identification
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237 See Goldman et al., supra note 16, at 15.
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DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 32.
239 Id. For expansion on the Material Support Statutes, see supra part I.A.1.b.
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DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 32.
241 See supra part I.A.1.
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Terrorist organizations require anonymity to avoid detection by the
authorities during and after these illegal transactions.243 Finally, anonymity is highly important for funding terrorist attacks.244 In particular, it is crucial for terrorist organizations that the attacker receiving the money is not detected prior to the operation.245
Terrorists can conceal their identities and reduce the risk that
their communications and financial activities will be detected.
While terrorists have been active on various online platforms for
more than two decades, the surface web has turned out to be too
risky for anonymity-seeking terrorists, as they can be monitored,
traced, and found.246 However, “the majority of the internet lies below the metaphorical waterline, unsearchable and inaccessible to the
general public.”247 The deepest layers of the internet, commonly
known as the dark net, “contai[n] content that has been intentionally
concealed including illegal and anti-social information.”248 It also
allows hidden transfers of funds, using cryptocurrencies that fulfill
terrorists’ needs for anonymous and secure streams of funding.249
This trend “is one of the most alarming combinations of organized
terrorism and [d]ark [n]et capabilities.”250 Because some cryptocurrencies provide the same form of anonymity in the financial setting
as the dark net does for communication systems, cryptocurrencies
are susceptible to abuse by terrorists who can utilize them and generate great benefits.251
Unlike regular bank transfers and accounts, law enforcement
agencies and counterterrorist professionals find it difficult to stop
transactions, track cryptocurrency assets, and freeze such assets to
disrupt illicit funding.252 Individuals can store infinite amounts of

243

See id. at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
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information in their heads simply by memorizing a private key that
gives access to funds on the blockchain, or by just writing this sequence on a piece of paper and keeping it.253 This makes it difficult
to enforce capital controls over cryptocurrencies. Terrorists can
raise funds through cryptocurrency donations from anyone and anywhere in the world by publishing their public cryptocurrency key
on a website, thereby avoiding relying on third-party intermediaries.254 For example, this makes it possible to exploit the Bitcoin system for crowdfunding campaigns that enable terrorist activities.255
Such illicit funding networks are hard to disrupt.256 Technology
makes it easier to use and access cryptocurrencies and the dark web
and provides terrorists with more opportunities to fundraise, operate,
and commit illicit operations, all while evading detection by authorities.257 Consequently, national security threats grow.258
a) The Problem of Counter Terrorism Financing in
Cryptocurrencies
Public blockchains use peer-to-peer networks that are autonomously managed.259 Information on the blockchain is secured and
decentralized, without encountering the compliance regulations of
the established financial system.260 As a result, it is difficult for law
enforcement and security organizations to identify users on the
blockchain.261 Various regulators and legislators have identified
cryptocurrencies’ tremendous risks and their potential to undermine
the successes of counter terrorism financing (“CTF”).262 Accordingly, “since May 2017, a U.S. congressional subcommittee has
been developing a bill to study the use of digital currencies by
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[t]errorists.”263 In January 2018, a Financial Technology Innovation
and Defense bill was introduced in Congress, aiming to establish an
Independent Financial Technology Task Force.264 Section 2 provides that Congress seeks to “prioritize the investigation of terrorist
and illicit use of new financial technology, including digital currencies,” among other provisions.265 Other bills also aim to promote the
analysis of the use of virtual currencies by terrorists.266
In addition, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) declared that it “regards developers as well as exchanges of
[virtual currency] as ‘money transmitters’ for the purposes of the US
Bank Secrecy Act.”267 FinCEN is the authority in charge of combating money laundering and terrorism financing through the financial
system.268 It does so through laws such as the Bank Secrecy Act,
which it supplements with instructions regarding registration with
FinCEN and the management of accounts.269 Among others, it
263

See Breu & Seitz, supra note 234, n.6 (“[At the] 115th Congress 1st Session Miss
Kathleen Rice from New York introduced the following bill to direct the Under Secretary
of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis to develop and disseminate a threat
assessment regarding terrorist use of virtual currency: “Homeland Security Assessment of
Terrorists Use of Virtual Currencies Act.”).
264
See DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 3–4 n.9; see also Financial Technology
Innovation and Defense Act, H.R. 4752, 115th Cong. (2018) (“To establish an Independent
Financial Technology Task Force, to provide rewards for information leading to
convictions related to terrorist use of digital currencies, to establish a FinTech Leadership
in Innovation Fund to encourage the development of tools and programs to combat terrorist
and illicit use of digital currencies, and for other purposes.”).
265 See D
ION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 3–4 (referring to the Financial
Technology Innovation and Defense Act, H.R. 4752, 115th Cong. (2018)). It should be
noted that there are other regulatory issues relating to cryptocurrencies such as investor
protection and prevention of fraud. These issues have also taken time to be resolved and
are still in an ongoing process. For example, in April 2019 the SEC finally issued its longawaited framework for “investors contract” analysis of digital assets. Framework for
“Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets
[https://perma.cc/9LXK-W7T5].
266 See, e.g., Homeland Security Assessment of Terrorists’ Use of Virtual Currencies Act,
H.R. 428, 116th Cong. (2019); see also JAY B. SYKES & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R45664, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND MONEY LAUNDERING: LEGAL BACKGROUND,
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 12 (2019).
267 Blake Hamil, Note, EU Cryptocurrency Regulation: Creating a Haven for Businesses
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requires money transmitters to have risk-based KYCs and antimoney laundering programs, in addition to reporting suspicious
transactions.270 In a 2018 letter, FinCEN made clear that virtual currency exchanges and administrators are considered “money services
businesses” and are therefore subject to the same requirements.271
The European Banking Authority also classified terrorists’ use of
cryptocurrencies as a high priority risk.272
During 2017 and 2019, regulators around the world began imposing regulations on ICOs in an attempt to protect investors and
prevent illegal use of tokens.273 Some countries, such as South Korea and China, went as far as banning ICOs altogether.274 South Korea banned all forms of cryptocurrency-based fundraising activities
and announced steps to marginalize cryptocurrency trading.275
China deemed ICOs entirely illegal.276 In September 2017, the most
important cryptocurrency exchanges in China announced they
would “voluntarily halt trading until further reports of government
interventions are publicly announced.”277
Shortly after China’s announcement, the Swiss Financial Markets Supervisory Authority announced it was investigating a number
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See DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION
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of ICOs for breaching anti-money laundering and terrorism financing provisions, among other regulations.278 Recently, Canada’s federal government has invoked, for the first time, its Emergencies Act.
Under the Emergencies Act, crowdfunding platforms and payment
services (including crypto) which are linked to them must now register with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of
Canada (“FINTRAC”).279 This is an attempt to broaden anti-money
laundering and terror financing rules so that they cover all sorts of
payment systems, including crypto.280
Yet despite these regulatory initiatives, regulatory uncertainty
still dominates the market; regulators and courts around the world
have yet to come up with a coherent solution to prevent money laundering and financing of terrorism through cryptocurrencies.281
Indeed, a key task of the policy enforcement, intelligence, and
financial regulatory communities must be to prevent terrorist groups
from using cryptocurrencies on a large scale.282 However, regulation
should not ban ICOs altogether, “throwing the baby out with the
bathwater” and relinquishing the tremendous benefits of cryptocurrencies. Instead, this Article proposes to focus on the illicit activities
and design identification and verification mechanisms that could be
embedded into technology to unmask illicit actors who abuse cryptocurrencies for illegal operations. This Article argues that the broad
anonymity in cryptocurrencies makes it easier for terrorists and
criminals to use cryptocurrencies for illicit purposes. It proposes to
consider the scope of anonymity in cryptocurrencies and outlines
ways to narrow the anonymity. Narrowing the scope of anonymity
278
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will allow to fight more efficiently against money laundering and
financing of terrorism via cryptocurrencies.283
b) Terrorists Adopting Cryptocurrencies: Current
Limitations and the Future
As this Article demonstrates, anonymous cryptocurrencies can
be attractive to terrorists; however, terrorists have yet to adopt cryptocurrencies on a large scale.284 This is likely due to cryptocurrencies’ instability285—by using cryptocurrencies, terrorist organizations are exposed to unwanted uncertainty. Another reason for the
limited use is that such tokens diminish terrorist leaders’ ability to
exercise control over funds entrusted to agents.286 In addition, difficulties associated with exchanging cryptocurrencies into fiat currencies persist.287 Finally, technical communication tools (such as internet reception) are difficult to penetrate in some geographical areas where terrorist organizations also affect the scale of adoption.288
After all, if a terrorist organization cannot easily exchange cryptocurrencies for large quantities of fiat currency or easily use them to
purchase weapons, food, housing in the areas where they operate,
and other necessary materials, these currencies do not contribute to
their operations.289
In the future, however, cryptocurrencies’ utility will likely grow
as both terrorist methods and technologies develop. Cryptocurrencies are expected to become sufficiently liquid and convertible.290
Such expected advances could facilitate the use of cryptocurrencies
for all users, allowing terrorist groups and organizations to engage
283
284
285
286
287
288
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in transnational fundraising and plan vast terror operations and attacks. Thus, one should not underestimate the future risks to national
security flowing from terrorists’ use of cryptocurrencies.
III. SPEAK OUT: THE CASE FOR EX ANTE VERIFICATION AND
VALIDATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY USER IDENTITY
The growing trend of using anonymous cryptocurrencies for terrorist purposes makes it significantly more important to identify the
users behind the tokens.291 The anonymity offered by some cryptocurrencies is one of the biggest problems in combating money laundering and terrorism financing, as it prevents cryptocurrency transactions from being adequately monitored. This lack of monitoring
leaves room for “shady transactions to occur outside of the regulatory perimeter,” and enables terrorist organizations “to use cryptocurrencies to obtain easy access to ‘clean cash.’”292
Researchers have recommended considering a system of mandatory user registration.293 However, “financial regulatory officials
have not devoted . . . adequate resources to regulating and examining non-bank financial institutions.”294 With respect to unveiling the
anonymity of users, no immediate action has been taken and, in
some jurisdictions, there is no mandatory obligation to register and
validate the identity of cryptocurrency users.295
At the time of writing this Article, regulatory oversight in the
United States is limited to KYC measures, which only partially reduce the anonymity built into cryptocurrency systems by making it
difficult to obtain cryptocurrencies anonymously on an exchange.296
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As mentioned earlier, KYC measures place an obligation on financial intermediaries to become familiar with their clients.297 The
main reason behind this requirement is that the financial intermediary needs to be able to identify unusual transactions in the client’s
account and report them to the anti-money laundering authorities or
the police.298 Requiring a KYC from people receiving cryptocurrencies on an exchange is a first measure, but it is not at all sufficient
to completely block illicit transactions.299 People trading cryptocurrencies on exchanges sometimes only make a single transaction on
an exchange and records from the exchange alone may be insufficient.300 This means that the exchange is not familiar with their usual
trade patterns in virtual assets and likely cannot detect what seems
to be irregular cryptocurrency activity.
Since cryptocurrencies are not restricted to a geographical setting, if exchanges operating in the United States or the European
Union become too nosy about the identity of the client, terrorists and
other criminals might simply use an exchange operating in a different jurisdiction that does not require a KYC.301 Lastly, KYC requirements on exchanges will not prevent funding at the ICO stage, because during the ICO, people usually do not purchase the token
through an exchange but rather pay the issuing firm directly with a
credit card.302 Thus, funds can be collected by terrorists or criminals
directly from the public; they can purchase the token in an ICO, and
then use it on the dark net to purchase weapons and other equipment
297
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needed to commit crimes and attacks.303 This means that the regulatory oversight, however, is limited:
In the United States, oversight does not cover nonexchange transactions, such as those brokered by localbitcoins.com, and does not cover fully on-blockchain transactions that occur outside of a regulated
entity, such as trading one cryptocurrency for another.304
It is for this reason, among others, that the Biden administration
intends to deepen the regulatory demands and issue a presidential
order to address the challenges posed by cryptocurrencies.305
A. Proposed Reform for Verifying, Validating, and Unmasking
Cryptocurrency User Identity
This juncture—when terrorists are beginning to discover cryptocurrencies’ benefits to commit terror attacks—is precisely the time
to consider whether anonymous tokens are truly necessary.306 This
is the key issue that needs to be addressed in the fight against money
laundering and terrorism financing via cryptocurrencies.307 This Part
proposes a mandatory obligation on wallet providers, exchanges,
and firms issuing new tokens to identify the cryptocurrency users on
the blockchain. This identification would be anonymized and not
available for all to see. However, law enforcement agencies could

303

Weimann, supra note 15 (“Terrorists too can use the Dark Net for fundraising, money
transfers and illegal purchase of explosives and weapons, using virtual currencies like
Bitcoin and other crypto-currencies.”).
304
DION-SCHWARZ ET al., supra note 17, at 49. For information on localbitcoins.com, see
Buy and Sell Bitcoins Everywhere, LOCALBITCOINS.COM, https://localbitcoins.com/
[https://perma.cc/STL5-SN2X].
305 See Exec. Order No. 14067 Fed. Reg. 05471 (Mar. 14, 2022); Hadar Y. Jabotinsky,
Roee Saral, When Biden Met Crypto: Thoughts on the President’s Executive Order, BLUE
SKY BLOG (Apr. 1, 2022), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2022/04/01/when-bidenmet-crypto-thoughts-on-the-presidents-executive-order/ [https://perma.cc/FUZ9-W7AF];
US Executive Order on Crypto: What Does It Mean?, ECON. TIMES,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/cryptocurrency/us-executive-order-oncrypto-what-does-it-mean/articleshow/90373461.cms
[https://perma.cc/83C9-JXAR]
(Mar. 22, 2022).
306
See HOUBEN & SNYERS, supra note 193, at 10.
307 See id. at 11 (“[M]andatory registration and a pre-set date as of which it applies would
be a better approach to unveil the anonymity of cryptocurrency users.”).
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request wallet providers, exchanges, and issuing firms to “speak
out” and unmask the identities of cryptocurrency users and holders
when there is probable cause to suspect illegality in their activities.
Our suggestion is not that blockchain transactions be exposed by
name to everyone, but rather that the firms issuing cryptocurrencies
be permitted to sell them only to clients individually screened via a
KYC.
In addition, all new users of the token (those buying from users
who purchased the token at an ICO) will have to identify themselves
to the firm that issued the token. This way, if a money laundering
activity is detected, the identity of the people behind the wallets can
be revealed to authorities. Both the Diem token and the non-anonymous digital tokens issued by Saga are examples of this idea.308 Both
of these tokens were designed to create international tokens that
would replace fiat currencies in part and enable global transactions.309 Ideally, everyone entering the blockchain to purchase one
of these tokens would have been required to identify themselves to
the corporation issuing the token.310 This would mean that at any
given time, the issuing firm or institution would have a registrar of
all blockchain users and could assist authorities in combating money
laundering and terrorism financing.
In fact, this suggestion is currently mirrored in part by the 5th
European Anti-Money Laundering Directive (“5AMLD”), which
was legislated on May 30, 2018, 311 and took effect in January

308

Saga (now “Sogur”) was a non-anonymous digital currency which sought to
complement existing national currencies, by working closely with established economic
institutions. To read more about the Saga initiative, see The Closure of Sogur, SOGUR,
https://www.sogur.com/ [https://perma.cc/N7PW-GMDE].
309 Rrustemi & Tuchschmid, supra note 206, at 21.
310
Identification can be conducted via video conferencing by having a KYC conversation
with potential users during which they would also hold up identification documents such
as an ID and a passport or a video KYC. See Emily Daniel, Video KYC Onboarding:
Fintechs Meeting KYC Compliance with Video Identifications, SHUFTIPROBLOG (Feb. 24,
2020), https://shuftipro.com/blog/video-kyc-onboarding/ [https://perma.cc/3LHA-N8LF].
Another method, practiced by Saga, is using a selfie taken by the client while also holding
a written sentence provided exclusively to him/her by Saga together with an identification
document. See Steve Cook, Selfie Banking: Is It a Reality?, BIOMETRIC TECH. TODAY, Mar.
2017, at 9, 9–11.
311
Council Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156) (EU).
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2020.312 This Directive is designed to achieve greater transparency
in financial transactions to prevent money laundering and terrorism
financing.313 This is the first time a directive has covered cryptocurrency transactions, since it applies to crypto service providers such
as virtual-fiat exchanges and crypto wallet providers.314 According
to the 5AMLD fact sheet: “[t]he rules will now apply to entities
which provide services that are in charge of holding, storing and
transferring virtual currencies.”315 It further specifies that the law
will increase transparency as to the real ownership of legal entities
and provide EU authorities with valuable information to help tackle
terrorist financing risks linked to the use of anonymous tokens.316
Moreover, on July 20, 2021, the European Commission presented legislative proposals to strengthen the EU’s Anti-Money
Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism
(“AML/CFT”) rules. Accordingly, anonymous crypto asset wallets
will be prohibited. The regulation compares such wallets to anonymous bank accounts which are already prohibited. Thus, fully applying EU AML/CFT rules to the crypto sector.317
312

Adriana M. Baranello, Comment, Money Laundering and the Art Market: Closing the
Regulatory Gap, 45 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 695, 730 (2021) (“The European Parliament
passed 5AMLD in 2018, and it took effect on January 10, 2020.”).
313
See, e.g., Matt Taylor, The Five Main Impacts of 5AMLD Regulation for Financial
Institutions, CONSULTANCY.UK (June 27, 2017), https://www.consultancy.uk/news/
13624/the-five-main-impacts-of-5amld-regulation-for-financial-institutions
[https://perma.cc/2625-BQQ7]; Dominic Kavakeb, Patchy Progress in Setting Up
Beneficial Ownership Registers in the EU, GLOB. WITNESS (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-moneylaundering/anonymous-company-owners/5amld-patchy-progress/
[https://perma.cc/QU25-F84J].
314 See Council Directive 2018/843, art. 1(2)(d)(19), 2018 O.J. (L 156) (EU)
(“‘[C]ustodian wallet provider’ means an entity that provides services to safeguard private
cryptographic keys on behalf of its customers, to hold, store and transfer virtual
currencies.”).
315 V
ĚRA JOUROVÁ, EUR. COMM’N, STRENGTHENED EU RULES TO PREVENT MONEY
LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING (July 9, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/
factsheet-main-changes-5th-anti-money-laundering-directive_en [https://perma.cc/VKP8R78F].
316
See id.
317 Beating Financial Crime: Commission Overhauls Anti-Money Laundering and
Countering the Financing of Terrorism Rules, EUR. COMM’N (July 20, 2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3690
[https://perma.cc/TX6Y-SJ5L] (“In addition, anonymous crypto asset wallets will be

2022]

SPEAK OUT

567

In the United States, Congress recently also initiated expansion
of cryptocurrency exchanges’ obligations. The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, passed by Congress in early 2021, broadened
the Bank Secrecy Act’s definition of “financial institution” to cover
businesses that exchange cryptocurrencies.318 Accordingly, exchanges should verify the identity of their consumers, develop customer risk profiles, and monitor transactions to submit suspicious activity reports.319 This new regulation, however, focuses on exchanges.
As noted,320 recently, President Biden signed the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act.321 Accordingly, cryptocurrency asset exchanges and custodians would need to collect information from their
customers, and keep track of the holding period and the buy and sell
prices of the digital assets in its customer’s accounts.322 Companies
that receive, or may in the future receive, payments in cryptocurrency, of over $10,000 (USD) worth, would need to file an IRS form
upon the receipt of cryptocurrency.323
On October 15, 2021, the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(“OFAC”) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, published a more
extensive Sanctions Compliance Guidance for the Virtual Currency
Industry.324 OFAC’s compliance obligations apply equally to transactions involving virtual currencies as well as to those involving traditional fiat currencies. As stated in the guidance: “[m]embers of the
virtual currency industry are responsible for ensuring that they do
not engage, directly or indirectly, in transactions prohibited by
OFAC sanctions, such as dealings with blocked persons or property,
or engaging in prohibited trade- or investment-related
prohibited, fully applying EU AML/CFT rules to the crypto sector.”); Ramin Farinpour, A
Snapshot of Recent Developments Regarding EU Counterterrorism Policies and
Legislation, 22 ERA F. 363, 369 (2021).
318 William M. Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021,
Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6003(5), 134 Stat. 3387, 4548 (2021).
319
31 C.F.R. § 1010 (2020). For further information, see Kirkpatrick et al., supra note
65.
320 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
321 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429 (2021).
322
See Jacobs et al., supra note 61.
323 Id.
324
OFF. FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL, SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE FOR THE VIRTUAL
CURRENCY INDUSTRY 1 (2021), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/virtual_
currency_guidance_brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK4M-75DP].
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transactions.”325 Accordingly: “[a]ll companies in the virtual currency industry, including technology companies, exchangers, administrators, miners, and wallet providers, as well as more traditional financial institutions that may have exposure to virtual currencies or their service providers, are encouraged to develop, implement, and routinely update, a tailored, risk-based sanctions compliance program.”326 The Guidance further provides best practices such
as management’s commitment to a “company’s sanctions compliance program”;327 risk assessment to the exposure to OFAC sanctions and steps taken to minimize their risks;328 and implement internal controls including obtaining information about customers
(KYC). The KYC should be taken “during onboarding and throughout the lifecycle of the customer relationship and use such information to conduct due diligence sufficient to mitigate potential sanctions-related risk.”329 While many digital currency companies will
be able to build out a compliance program that satisfies OFAC under
the framework provided in this Guidance, aspects of the Guidance
need more clarity as to how they may apply to Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (“DAOs”),330 especially as these DAOs play a
critical role in the new evolving industry of non-fungible tokens
(“NFTs”).331
This Article takes the idea of unveiling anonymity one step further: it argues that the firms issuing the tokens should also be obligated to unmask the identity of their clients by requiring a KYC
from anyone entering their blockchain and using their token.

325

Id.
Id. at 10.
327 Id. at 11.
328 Id. at 12.
329 Id. at 14.
330
Steven Merriman et al., OFAC Releases New Detailed Guidance for the Digital
Currency Industry, JD SUPRA (Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ofacreleases-new-detailed-guidance-for-5887592/ [https://perma.cc/2E5V-EV43].
331 Hadar Y. Jabotinsky & Michal Lavi, NFT for Eternity (2022) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
326
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B. Unmasking and the Fourth Amendment After Carpenter: The
Need for Court Warrant
As previously mentioned, this Article proposes that cryptocurrency wallet providers, issuers of new cryptocurrencies, and exchanges should “speak out” and unmask the identity of their users
when law enforcement and intelligence agencies require this information for their investigations. The following Subsection will explain that in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Carpenter
v. United States,332 government agencies cannot compel wallet providers, issuers of new cryptocurrencies, or exchanges to unmask and
turn over an internet user’s identifying records without a warrant. A
warrant requirement is desirable, as it safeguards the legitimate privacy interests of users, while allowing law enforcement and intelligence agencies to conduct investigations and enforce the law.333
Without a warrant, courts are likely to conclude that regulations for
unmasking cryptocurrency user identities are unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment,334 and therefore would likely strike it down.
1. The Fourth Amendment: Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy
The Fourth Amendment is “at the heart of American democracy.”335 It is key in protecting U.S. citizens against governmental
power336 and ensuring that the government cannot gather information about citizens without proper oversight and limitations.337 It
requires the government put forth a compelling reason for its interest
332

138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (accessing historical records containing physical
locations of cellphones necessitates a search warrant).
333 Id. at 2213–14; Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data: Can Carpenter
Build a Stable Privacy Doctrine?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 441 (2019).
334 U.S. C
ONST. amend. IV.
335
Travis Panneck, Note, Incognito Mode Is in the Constitution, 104 MINN. L. REV. 511,
537 (2019).
336 See Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the
Limits of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1727 (2020) (explaining that the
American constitutional system has no explicit constitutional right to privacy, however, it
protects individuals against governmental violations of privacy). For further elaboration on
this point, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 93 (2011).
337 See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. R
EV. 1511, 1513,
1529 (2010).
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in personal information.338 Government officials are required to obtain warrants supported by probable cause before they can place individuals under surveillance or search them.339 In other words, the
government needs to demonstrate reasonably trustworthy information that the government’s search will uncover evidence of illegality.340 If the government fails to follow these procedures, the information will be excluded from trial.341 Warrant obligations lead to
better decisions regarding searches, as they raise awareness of the
consequences of searches and obligate authorities to express their
reasoning.342
The Fourth Amendment uses the terms “searches and seizures”
to cover everything from rummaging through people’s papers to
trespassing.343 However, technology has challenged this approach.344 At first, in Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that wiretaps do not violate the Fourth Amendment since they
do not involve entry upon premises.345 Yet, in the 1967 case Katz v.
United States, the Supreme Court narrowed the permissible scope of
surveillance under the Fourth Amendment and declared Olmstead a
mistake.346 Whereas the Court previously applied the Fourth
Amendment only to physical trespass, it now declared that the
Fourth Amendment extends to “people, not places.”347 The current
approach to Fourth Amendment application thus emerged from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz.348 Accordingly, the Fourth
Amendment should regulate whenever a person exhibits an “actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to

338

See SOLOVE, supra note 336.
See id. at 95.
340
See id.
341 See id. at 95–96.
342
See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1609, 1642 (2012).
343 See SOLOVE, supra note 336, at 96.
344 See id.
345 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928); see also SOLOVE, supra note 336, at 98 (explaining that this
decision enabled the government to gather a lot of private information).
346 389 U.S. 347, 353, 359 (1967) (ruling that warrantless electronic bugging in a public
telephone booth is unconstitutional).
347 Id. at 351.
348
See SOLOVE, supra note 336, at 99.
339
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recognize as ‘reasonable.’”349 This approach is the “reasonable expectation to privacy test.”350 The goal of this test is “to permit the
Fourth Amendment to respond to changing technology.”351
2. The Third-Party Doctrine: No Reasonable Expectation to
Information Held by Third Parties
A prominent exception to the reasonable expectation of privacy
test outlined in Katz v. United States, is the third-party doctrine: a
constitutional rule that permits the state to access business records
and transactional data about a company’s consumers without constituting a Fourth Amendment “search.”352 If information is possessed or known by third parties, then for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, an individual lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the information.353
This doctrine was crafted by the Supreme Court in the 1970s.354
In United States v. Miller, law enforcement officials sought the financial records of bank customer Mitch Miller, issuing subpoenas
to his bank to obtain “all records of [his] accounts.”355 Without advising Miller, the bank turned over his incriminating records to the
349

See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See SOLOVE, supra note 336, at 99. Justice Harlan’s concurrence was later adopted by
the Court in full in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (using Justice Harlan’s
two-step formulation to frame the Fourth Amendment analysis that includes subjective
expectation of privacy and objective reasonableness of such expectation). For further
information, see Panneck, supra note 335, at 519–20. See also Amitai Etzioni, iPhone vs.
Trump: How Technology Companies Can Protect Both Customers and National Security,
NAT’L INT. (Jan. 19, 2020), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/iphone-vs-trump-howtechnology-companies-can-protect-both-customers-and-national-security
[https://perma.cc/4RAE-6KH8].
351 See SOLOVE, supra note 336, at 99.
352
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. See also SOLOVE, supra note 336, at 102. For an overview on
the background of the doctrine, its justifications, and further expansion, see Orin S. Kerr,
The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV 561, 566–70 (2009); Jane
Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 206 (2015).
353 See Kerr, supra note 352, at 564 (arguing that the third-party doctrine actually
prevents technology from giving a leg up to the criminals and makes it possible to level the
playing field). For criticism of such approach, asserting that it gives too much power
surveillance power to the government vis-à-vis innocent citizens, see SOLOVE, supra note
336, at 109.
354
See SOLOVE, supra note 336, at 103.
355 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976). For further information, see S
OLOVE, supra note 336, at
104; Panneck, supra note 335, at 521–22.
350
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government.356 Miller argued that, under the Fourth Amendment,
the government was required to obtain a warrant before receiving
the records.357 Holding that Miller had no reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding the bank records, the Court explained that Miller
had “voluntarily conveyed” the records to the bank and that the information was “exposed to their employees in the ordinary course
of business.”358 From this holding, the Court thus “extended the
third-party doctrine beyond conversations to encompass business
records.”359
Three years later, the third-party doctrine was further expanded
in Smith v. Maryland.360 The Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to pen registers—devices that record the
phone number a person dials for outgoing calls361—denying a reasonably subjective or objective expectation of privacy in such
cases.362 The Court concluded that since people expose their phone
numbers to phone companies who have the capacity to record information, customers assume the risk that the numbers dialed will be
turned over to the police.363 Thus, the information is not protected
by the Fourth Amendment.364 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment
does not protect bank transactions, dialed phone numbers and contacts, or other records maintained by third parties.365 Scholars have
criticized the third-party doctrine for failing “to comprehend the
concept of confidentiality—as well as the concept of a promise.”366

356

Miller, 425 U.S. at 438.
Id. at 441.
358
Id. at 442.
359
See Panneck, supra note 335, at 521–22.
360 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979) (a pen register revealing a telephone number dialed from
the defendant’s home was not within the Fourth Amendment’s scope); SOLOVE, supra note
336, at 104.
361
Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46; Panneck, supra note 335, at 522.
362 S
OLOVE, supra note 336, at 104 (“These cases form the backbone of the third party
doctrine. If any information is exposed to a third party, then there’s no reasonable
expectation of privacy in it.”).
363 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
364
Id. at 745–46. See also Panneck, supra note 335, at 522–23; SOLOVE, supra note 336,
at 104.
365
See SOLOVE, supra note 336, at 104–05.
366 Id. at 108 (explaining that if a bank promises confidentiality, the consumer expects
the bank to keep this promise and there should be a reasonable expectation of privacy). For
357
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As the following Subsection explains, the Supreme Court recently
called the third-party doctrine into question and has, in fact, narrowed it substantially.
3. Shifting the Approach to the Third-Party Doctrine:
Carpenter v. United States
“[T]he role of courts is to protect the balance of power between
the state . . . and the people, refusing to let technological change
eviscerate individual privacy and security from the state.”367 The
Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States368 “presents
a new way forward that safeguards legitimate privacy interests,”
while maintaining law enforcement’s ability to police bad actors.369
In Carpenter, the Court held that law enforcement officials may
not collect historical cell site location information (“CSLI”) from a
cell phone service provider without a warrant showing probable
cause.370 The majority opinion declined to extend the third-party
doctrine to the FBI’s collection of seven days’ worth of CSLI from
cell phone service providers.371 Thus, it reinvented the “reasonable
expectation of privacy”372 and narrowed the third-party doctrine.373
The majority opinion extends beyond location information;374 it addresses information that law enforcement authorities can use to locate people generally, not just through CSLI specifically.375 Although the Court in Carpenter expressly declined to overrule Miller
criticism of the third party doctrine, see NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY:
RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 136–39 (2015).
367 Ohm, supra note 73, at 386.
368
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
369
Panneck, supra note 335, at 513.
370 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223; Ohm, supra note 73, at 361; Olivier Sylvain, The
Market for User Data, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1087, 1095 (2019).
371 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; Ohm, supra note 73, at 363.
372
Ohm, supra note 73, at 358; Panneck, supra note 335, at 528 (explaining that the
Court recognized that it was not merely concerned with an individual’s movements, but
the private personal information one might discover in knowing about that person’s
movements.).
373 See Ohm, supra note 73, at 358.
374
Id. at 364 (“[T]he majority opinion is not restricted to CSLI. Instead, this is an opinion
about information the police can use to locate people generally, not CSLI specifically.”).
375
See id. at 369 (“The test that emerges from the majority opinion will also be applied
to collections of information maintained by third parties that do not track location, not even
by inference, but are of interest to law enforcement.”).
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and Smith,376 hints throughout Carpenter suggest that these two
opinions should be interpreted narrowly in the future to the specific
facts of the cases being decided.377 The case of Carpenter can open
the door “to protecting all kinds of digital information.”378 However,
the decision is vague and “leave[s] numerous important issues ‘unresolved and uncertain.’”379 It should be noted that empirical research surveying courts judicial decisions that cited Carpenter revealed disagreements among lower courts with regards to the
breadth of Carpenter. Some courts apply its concepts extensively
while others attempt to narrow it down.380
4. Extending Carpenter to Unmasking Cryptocurrency Users
Carpenter called into question the third-party doctrine and signaled a departure from precedent. Indeed, there are disagreements
among courts regarding the scope of Carpenter,381 and at least one
court denied a motion to suppress evidence obtained through a
search warrant regarding the identification of cryptocurrency identity.382 As Professor Neil Richards recently explained, the third-

376

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“We do not disturb the application of Smith and
Miller . . . .”) (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979)); Ohm, supra note 73, at 359; Panneck, supra note 335, at 541.
377
See Ohm, supra note 73, at 385 (explaining that Carpenter “turns the third-party
doctrine inside out, requiring the government to account for the database design and
information-gathering decisions of private parties, decisions made without any state
intervention”).
378 Matthew Tokson, The Aftermath of Carpenter: An Empirical Study of Fourth
Amendment Law 2018–2021, 135 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 8) (on
file with author).
379
Id.
380 See id. (manuscript at 9).
381
Id. (manuscript at 13) (“Several scholars have conjectured about the meaning of
Carpenter going forward, but they have reached sharply different conclusions.”).
382
See generally United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2020). In this case,
federal agents used an outside service to analyze the publicly viewable Bitcoin blockchain
and identify a cluster of Bitcoin addresses controlled by a child pornography website that
defendant used to download material. Id. at 309. The court held that defendant lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his information on the Bitcoin Blockchain where the
nature of the information on the Bitcoin blockchain and the voluntariness of the exposure
weigh heavily against finding a privacy interest in an individual’s information on the
blockchain. Id. at 310. The court also held that transactions and records that exchanges
have do not receive Fourth Amendment protection. Id. at 312; see also Daniel Penn, Note,
The Fifth Circuit, Fourth Amendment, and the Third-Party Doctrine: Two Takeaways from
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party doctrine is not dead. The legacy of Carpenter means requiring
courts to undertake “a delicate balance between the remnants of the
third-party doctrine and a notion of Fourth Amendment protection.”383 We, however, believe that Carpenter’s departure from
precedent can justify further extensions beyond the explicit holding,384 and with time, more courts are likely to follow a broad interpretation of the case.385
This Article argues that unmasking cryptocurrency users’ identities should also be subject to a warrant and require the government
to show probable cause of illegality. Cryptocurrency users have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Cryptocurrencies are different
from banks that are subject to governmental regulation and reporting
obligations. The anonymity of the token is exactly the reason for
using such tokens. Unmasking the identities of cryptocurrency users
can reveal information regarding users’ financial activities. Thus,
such unmasking should be exempt from the third-party doctrine as
applied in Carpenter.
Applying the third-party doctrine to cryptocurrency users and
unmasking cryptocurrency user identities without a warrant would
hinder sufficient protection for users against governmental intrusion. Consequently, users would be disincentivized from using such
tokens for legitimate purposes. Without a warrant requirement, even
beneficial uses of cryptocurrency would likely grind to a halt,386 resulting in losses for the economy and society. This is especially
alarming as cryptocurrencies are now used also to trade in cryptoassets like NFTs, which could in the future become the engine of

the Court’s First Ruling on Bitcoin Privacy, 24 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 125, 128 (2021);
David Zaslowsky, Court Analogizes Coinbase to ‘Traditional Bank’ for Purposes of Fourth
Amendment Privacy Protection, BAKER MCKENZIE: BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (July 2, 2020),
https://blockchain.bakermckenzie.com/2020/07/02/court-analogizes-coinbase-totraditional-bank-for-purposes-of-fourth-amendment-privacy-protection/
[https://perma.cc/7WXP-P6EW].
383 RICHARDS, supra note 91, at 59 (referring the third-party doctrine as an outdated
privacy rule but clarifying, however, that Carpenter did not abolish the doctrine).
384
See Panneck, supra note 335, at 542.
385 Tokson, supra note 378 (manuscript at 4) (“[T]he proportion of cases employing
narrow interpretations of Carpenter has decreased over time, as familiarity with the
Carpenter standard has likely increased.”).
386
See SOLOVE, supra note 336, at 109 (expanding on the importance of a warrant).
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speech.387 Therefore, this Article concludes that necessitating a warrant to unmask cryptocurrency users’ identities achieves the proper
balance between individuals’ legitimate privacy interests and national security concerns, allowing law enforcement to police bad actors in the age of advancing technology.
IV. ADDRESSING THE OBJECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Verifying and unmasking cryptocurrency identities is not a “silver bullet,” and may have certain limitations and shortcomings. Several objections to the proposed framework can be anticipated and
should be addressed accordingly. This final Part of the Article addresses such concerns.
A. The First Amendment
In the United States, freedom of speech enjoys stronger protections than in other Western democracies.388 The First Amendment
protects freedom of speech against governmental censorship.389 The
“right to record” can protect data collection;390 raw data may also
enjoy First Amendment protections;391 and even a source code can
be considered protected speech.392 The following Subsections
387

See generally Jabotinsky & Lavi, supra note 331.
See Evelyn Douek, Governing Online Speech: From “Posts-As-Trumps” to
Proportionality and Probability, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 772 (2021); Oreste Pollicino &
Marco Bassini, Free Speech, Defamation and the Limits to Freedom of Expression in the
EU: A Comparative Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU INTERNET LAW 513–28
(Andrej Savin & Jan Trzaskowski eds., 2014). For criticism, see MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE
CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION 18–20 (2019) (arguing that legislators, courts, and civil rights
organizations have interpreted the First Amendment selectively, almost like religious
fundamentalists, and in fact shifted even more power from vulnerable populations to
powerful ones).
389 U.S. C
ONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”).
390 See Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. R
EV. 167, 180–
81 (2017).
391 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 65, 72 (2014) (explaining
that the First Amendment can protect raw data as it promotes the creation of knowledge).
392
See generally Michael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well: Anonymity in a Time of
Surveillance, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 95, 100–05 (2017); see also Justin S. Wales & Richard J.
Ovelmen, Bitcoin Is Speech: Notes Toward Developing the Conceptual Contours of Its
Protection Under the First Amendment, 74 U. MIA. L. REV. 204, 255 (2019); Kyle
Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of “Information as Speech,” 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 761, 770
388
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address freedom of expression objections to the proposed verification, validation, and unmasking of cryptocurrency user identity.
1. Cryptocurrency Users: Identity Verification, Unmasking,
and Freedom of Expression
One can argue that imposing an obligation to verify the identity
of cryptocurrency users and allowing unmasking thereof infringes
on users’ freedom of expression, as it limits their anonymity. This,
in turn, can censor their speech as reflected in their use of cryptocurrencies. As such, courts could arguably strike down this regulation.
Identifying speakers can often provide information about their
activities, even without knowing the content of communication.393
Therefore, the right to communicate anonymously is protected by
U.S. law.394 A line of cases made clear that there is a constitutional
right to anonymous religious and political speech.395
Upon first glance, it can be argued that individuals’ use of cryptocurrencies is not speech and that restrictions on the anonymity of
cryptocurrency users do not constitute restrictions on the marketplace of ideas, but rather on the marketplace of commerce.396 Yet,
one might still argue that cryptocurrencies are not just forms of digital payment; they also have non-financial applications. Such tokens
facilitate users’ engagement in expressive activities with one

(2016) (referring to Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal.
1996)); see also Bernstein, 922 F. Supp at 1435 (holding that source code, whether
functional or not, is always speech protected by the First Amendment, because “the
functionality of a language does not make it any less like speech.”).
393 See Froomkin, supra note 392, at 99.
394
See id. at 149.
395 See generally, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (voiding a Los Angeles
City ordinance that forbade the distribution of any handbills in any place under any
circumstances, if the handbills did not contain the name and address of the person by whom
they were prepared); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (voiding
an Ohio statute prohibiting anonymous campaign literature, and holding that such a law
violates the First Amendment and as such is unconstitutional); Buckley v. Am. Const. L.
Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 198–200, 204 (1999); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y.
v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 127, 165–70 (2002).
396
See Alexander Tsesis, Marketplace of Ideas, Privacy, and Digital Audiences, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1585, 1588 (2019) (differentiating between marketplace behavior
and freedom of expression).
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another.397 Cryptocurrencies also enable users “to include non-financial data (called ‘arbitrary data’) that, once the associated (often
nominal) transaction is validated, become[] immutably published
onto [the cryptocurrency’s] blockchain . . . .”398 In addition, cryptocurrencies have communicative value as they allow users to communicate in ways previously unimaginable and to express their lack
of trust in central economies.399 Verifying cryptocurrency users’
identities and subjecting them to possible unmasking could result in
censorship of expressive activities.
However, although the use of cryptocurrencies can be considered speech, the proposed regulation focuses on illegal aspects of
financial activities and applications enabled by cryptocurrencies,
and not on expressive values. Focusing on financial conduct can be
treated, at most, as commercial speech.400 Even if recognized as
speech, regulations should only be subject to intermediate scrutiny
standards.401
Identity verification and validation of cryptocurrency users applies to all users in a content neutral way, irrespective of the content
of their transactions.402 Unmasking reveals users’ identities and does
not restrict their choice to use cryptocurrencies. Moreover, there are
safeguards preventing authorities from unmasking identities of
cryptocurrency users regularly, posing a high standard of probable
cause. Such safeguards are likely to prevent infringement of

397

Wales & Ovelmen, supra note 392, at 204.
Id. at 222.
399
Id. at 241.
400
Scholars have criticized the court’s treatment of market behavior as speech. However,
if courts are to treat the financial aspects of cryptocurrency use as speech, they should be
treated as commercial speech at most. For criticism on the lack of differentiation between
market behavior and speech in a related context of platform immunity from liability for
harmful speech, see Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The Internet as a Speech
Machine and Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Reform, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 45, 51
(2020) (“Section 230’s liability shield has been extended to activity that has little or nothing
to do with free speech, such as the sale of dangerous products.”).
401 See generally Felix T. Wu, Commercial Speech Protection as Consumer Protection,
90 U. COLO. L. REV. 631 (2019); see Tsesis, supra note 396, at 1585, 1620, 1626.
402 For discussion of content neutral restrictions, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48 (1987) (“Content-neutral restrictions limit
expression without regard to the content or communicative impact of the message
conveyed.”).
398
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legitimate free choice to use cryptocurrency. A substantial chill on
the legitimate use of cryptocurrencies is not expected; users would
know that unmasking only occurs when a warrant is issued and
when there is probable cause that cryptocurrency is being misused
for illegal transfers or transactions. Thus, identity verification and
unmasking obligations are likely to survive intermediary scrutiny in
terms of preserving users’ free speech. Such regulations are constitutionally justified—it is narrowly tailored to serve the substantial
national security interest.403
2. Wallet Providers, Exchanges, and Issuing Firms: Identity
Verification, Unmasking, and Freedom of Expression
Another objection concerns wallet providers and issuing firms’
freedom of expression. It can be argued that the proposed identity
verification and unmasking obligations limit these parties’ freedom
to shape their systems’ software codes; code is information, and information is speech.404 Because computer language and code are
forms of speech, specific obligations to program a system in this
way—ex ante identity verification and ex post unmasking—infringes wallet providers, exchanges, and issuing firms’ freedom of
expression.405
It should be noted that the rush to claim First Amendment protections for non-expressive, but code-dependent technologies has
been criticized by scholars as diluting the First Amendment’s core
principles and threatening its strength.406 However, courts currently
recognize freedom of expression interests in code.407 Thus, one

403

See Tsesis, supra note 396, at 1614 (explaining the intermediary scrutiny test and the
focus of speech restrictions on reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions).
404
See generally Bambauer, supra note 391 (arguing that data can enjoy First
Amendment protection when it promotes the right to create knowledge); see also, e.g.,
Ellen Nakashima & Mark Berman, Apple Says FBI Seeks ‘Dangerous Power,’ Files
Motion Opposing Court Order to Help Unlock iPhone, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/25/apple-files-motionopposing-court-orderto-help-fbi-unlock-iphone/ [https://perma.cc/B8JG-9L9H].
405
See Langvardt, supra note 392, at 771, 798–99.
406 See id. at 761.
407
See, e.g., Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
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might argue that courts could strike down the proposed regulations
for violating wallet providers’ First Amendment rights.
However, although such technological tools can be considered
speech, the value of this speech is not absolute. Such technological
tools do not raise the kind of core expressive interests that warrant
First Amendment protection.408 Programming a technological tool
that instructs financial systems is not a way to participate in the marketplace of ideas, but rather a form of market behavior that uses
speech.409 A product or tool’s code is constructed by speech that is
commercial in nature. Accordingly, the obligation to embed identity
verification and unmasking capabilities within the code should not
be subject to strict scrutiny standards; it should only be subject to
intermediary scrutiny instead. The government has a substantial interest in this regulation due to its importance in stifling terror operations and attacks. This regulation is content neutral: it avoids dictating exactly how to program the code. Furthermore, it does not
interfere with the system’s general operations. Rather, it sets enabling identity verification and unmasking capabilities as goals. As
such, it is narrowly tailored to serve national security interests.
B. From the Cathedral to the Bazaar and Back to the Cathedral
Again? Concerns Regarding Centralized Power Distribution
The Cathedral and the Bazaar are two well-known models to engineer a software.410 The Cathedral model restricts the code developed to an exclusive centralized group of software developers. In
contrast, the Bazaar model is decentralized. The code developed is
an open-source code and can be viewed by the public. Although
these models originally refer to engineering software, these models
and metaphors of Cathedral and Bazaar can describe broader social
contexts and structures, such as the structure of financial systems.

408

RICHARDS, supra note 91, at 182.
For discussion in the related context of algorithmic speech, see Dennis D. Hirsch,
From Individual Control to Social Protection: New Paradigms for Privacy Law in the Age
of Predictive Analytics, 79 MD. L. REV. 439, 502 (2020).
410 This metaphor of cathedral and bazaar was coined by Eric S. Raymond in a related
context, comparing centralized licensed computer code and Linux. See generally ERIC S.
RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY
AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (1999).
409
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The traditional financial system can be conceptualized within
the Cathedral model; the medium of currency exchange requires
large, centralized government institutions’ involvement and regulatory authorities.411 In contrast, cryptocurrencies can be conceptualized within the Bazaar model, as they operate in an autonomous and
distributed manner, independent of any trusted authority or centralized operator.412 They lack sovereign backing and many features of
national currency systems.413 Cryptocurrency systems can be likened to a “bazaar,”414 as a “libertarian ethos that animates many of
the individuals and entities involved in the creation and growth of
the [cryptocurrency] movement.”415
However, placing legal obligations on wallet providers, exchanges, and issuing firms might lead to centrality and, in fact, signal a shift back to the Cathedral model, where central intermediaries
regulate the market. Similarly, the internet was once thought to be a
harbinger of disintermediation—a sovereign medium controlled by
users from the bottom up. Now, the internet has shifted and created
new gatekeepers: online intermediaries.416 A similar development
could occur in the cryptocurrency system, which is already becoming less decentralized.417 It is theoretically true that imposing
411

This model includes central banks. Reem Heakal, What Central Banks Do,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/050703.asp
[https://perma.cc/F5TV-UJMU] (June 23, 2021).
412
Primavera De Filippi et al., Blockchain as a Confidence Machine: The Problem of
Trust & Challenges of Governance, 62 TECH. SOC’Y, Aug. 2020, at 11, Article 101284
(“[B]lockchain technology is often described as a ‘trustless’ technology because it
eliminates the need for a trusted authority and replaces it with a system of publicly
verifiable proofs.”).
413
See Goldman et al., supra note 16, at 14.
414 RAYMOND, supra note 410.
415
See Goldman et al., supra note 16, at 7.
416 See supra Part II (expanding on the role of intermediaries as gatekeepers); see also
JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
INFORMATION CAPITALISM 75 (2019) (explaining that some aspects of the conception of
“technologies of freedom” have changed beyond recognition and “[t]oday’s networked
digital information infrastructures have different and more complicated affordances[]”);
Michal Lavi, Targeting Exceptions, 32 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 65, 138
(2021).
417 See De Filippi, supra note 19 (“Over the years, the governance of the most popular
blockchain networks has become highly centralized, and only a few large corporations
(such as the main blockchain exchanges and wallet providers) are responsible for making
blockchain technology accessible to the wider public.”).
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identity verification and unmasking obligations on wallet providers,
exchanges, and issuing firms could increase these parties’ involvement in regulation, distort the power distribution in the infrastructure, and undermine the decentralized model that avoids shortcomings of traditional financial institutions and state control. Such obligations might impair user trust in the system and hinder innovation.
Therefore, one could reason that it is unwise to discourage a successful and innovative model just because illicit actors, such as terrorists, use it.418
Indeed, imposing obligations on wallet providers, exchanges,
and issuing firms is no panacea. However, identity verification and
unmasking obligations subject to court warrants are not directed at
transactions or at the technologies. Thus, they are different from traditional gatekeepers, such as payment blockades.419 Because users’
identities are encrypted and can only be unmasked subject to a warrant with probable cause, such regulation would primarily target illicit actors using the system.420 It is likely to have little impact on
legitimate financial transactions or transfers by innocent users.
Therefore, it is not expected to have far-reaching influence on the
system’s special structure or on the trust of innocent users therein.
Admittedly, the proposed regulation allocates increased power
to wallet providers, exchanges, and issuing firms. Despite targeting
illicit actors, it might disrupt the decentralized structure of the system. However, when balancing the possible social costs of such disruption against the national security benefits, the proposed intervention is worthwhile.
C. Administrative Costs
The third objection concerns the administrative costs associated
with user identity verification, information storage and security, and
unmasking procedures. Any new and heavy regulatory regime
would make all transactions costlier and less convenient.421 Arguably, imposing such costs on wallet providers, exchanges, and issuing
418
419

For this argument, see HOUBEN & SNYERS, supra note 193, at 10.
On payment blockade, see the discussion supra Part I. See generally Bridy, supra note

100.
420
421

See HOUBEN & SNYERS, supra note 193, at 55–56.
See Breu & Seitz, supra note 234.
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firms places a heavy burden on these actors. Such regulation might
even cause them to exit the market.422 Moreover, new investors
might refrain from investing in such systems and decline to develop
new types of innovative cryptocurrencies. Thus, such regulation
could lead to market inefficiencies.423
Though the proposed regulation has costs, the benefits of such a
solution in stifling terrorist activities and enhancing national security exceed the costs of implementing an identity verification framework. Overall, the proposed regulation promotes welfare maximization.424 In the United States, similar obligations are common, such
as unmasking procedures that involve costs of litigation, despite the
burdens they impose.425 For example, there are John Doe subpoenas
to unmask anonymous speakers from their ISP or the website on
which they posted defamatory comments.426 Imposing obligations
on traditional intermediaries to provide information in John Doe
procedures can be justified from an economic perspective, because
such intermediaries are best positioned to collect, store, and provide
helpful information in legal procedures.427 The proposed regulation
is justified based on similar arguments.
422

This is indeed already happening following the 5th European Anti-Money Laundering
Directive. Bottle Pay, a UK-based crypto wallet provider, announced its decision to cease
operations at the end of last year. See Rachel Wolfson, What the 5th Anti-Money
Laundering Directive Means for Crypto Businesses, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/what-the-5th-anti-money-laundering-directive-means-forcrypto-businesses [https://perma.cc/TUX8-9CV8] (“As we are a UK based custodial
Bitcoin wallet provider, we will have to comply with the 5AMLD EU regulation coming
into effect on January 10, 2020. The amount and type of extra personal information we
would be required to collect from our users would alter the current user experience so
radically, and so negatively, that we are not willing to force this onto our community.”).
423 See generally Jabotinsky & Sarel, supra note 26.
424
On the role of legal rules in promotion of welfare maximization, see generally John
R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939).
425
See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
39, 225, 258 (Yale Univ. Press, 1970) (discussing the costs of litigation).
426 Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118
YALE L.J. 320, 325 (2008) (explaining the consideration and standards that U.S. courts
apply when considering whether to order John Doe subpoenas). See also Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn From John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV.
1373, 1374–75 (2009).
427
See generally Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberbullying and the First Amendment, 14 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 99, 114 (2012) (“The downside of limited liability for online service
providers is that there is little onus placed on the parties in the best position to curb harmful
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Similarly, an EU proposal regarding digital services, the Digital
Services Act (“DSA”),428 attempts to impose obligations on online
marketplaces to identify traders that offer products or services and
to collect detailed information on the identity of these traders.429 According to the regulation, platforms must make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the information provided to them by the traders is accurate and complete. This new duty is expected to increase administrative costs. However, because such a duty is expected to assist in
detecting rogue traders and protect online shoppers from counterfeit
or dangerous products, and because it allows enforcement of such
violations,430 it can be justified.
The U.S. Congress followed this direction; thus, the House Energy and Commerce Committee is marking up the proposed bill.431
The bill is in fact a “know your customer” law for sellers online,
requiring marketplaces to collect information from high-volume
sellers, verify the information, make high-volume sellers disclose
contact information to consumers, and enable electronic and telephonic reporting of “suspicious activity” in the marketplace.432
Cryptocurrency identity verification is thus not revolutionary.
Moreover, such verification was already planned to be conducted
voluntarily by Diem and Saga, which intended to verify the credentials of all coin users.433 It follows that costs of identity verification

conduct to take active steps or expend significant resources to do so.”); Winhkong Hua,
Note, Cybermobs, Civil Conspiracy, and Tort Liability, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1217, 1230
(2017).
428
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and Amending Directive
2000/31/EC, COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020).
429
Id. at para. 46.
430 See Miriam C. Buiten, The Digital Services Act: From Intermediary Liability to
Platform Regulation, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 361, 376 (2021).
431 H.R. 5502, 117th Cong. (2021).
432 Eric Goldman, Comments on HB 5502, the “INFORM” Act, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG
(Nov 17, 2021), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/11/comments-on-hb-5502the-inform-act.htm [https://perma.cc/CQ8X-YQUY].
433
See, e.g., LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 70; The Closure of Sogur, supra note 308.
See also Mike Orcutt, The Radical Idea Hiding Inside Facebook’s Digital Currency
Proposal, MIT TECH. REV. (June 25, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/
06/25/800/how-facebooks-new-blockchain-might-revolutionize-our-digital-identities/
[https://perma.cc/AL83-4VR4].
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are not inherently unreasonable. Therefore, in light of the importance of verification and unmasking for national security and
crime prevention, such verification should be obligatory for all cryptocurrency wallet providers, exchanges, and issuing firms.
D. Data Breach Concerns
The fourth objection focuses on data breach concerns. The proposed regulation obligates wallet providers to verify their users’
identities. Such dossiers of personal information can be hacked and
misused by illicit actors, raising security and privacy risks,434 such
as identity theft435 and fraud.436 Many privacy laws focus on the obligations of data collectors and processors to obtain informed and
explicit consent before collecting personal data, but such laws still
do not protect personal information from hacks.437 Such data
breaches can result in tremendous harm, including identity theft and
other economic and emotional harms.438
Indeed, stored personal information regarding cryptocurrency
users’ identities can be hacked and misused by illicit actors.439 Data
breaches are a major problem in the information age in general.440
However, the risk of a data breach should not prevent personal

434

For such a concern in a related context, see Fennie Wang & Primavera De Filippi,
Self-Sovereign Identity in a Globalized World: Credentials-Based Identity Systems as a
Driver for Economic Inclusion, FRONTIERS IN BLOCKCHAIN (Jan. 23, 2020), https://
www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbloc.2019.00028/full
[https://perma.cc/SK3P78VC].
435 See Sara S. Greene, Stealing Identity from the Poor, 106 M
INN. L. REV. 59, 62 (2021)
(discussing identity theft and the difficulties to recover from it); CARISSA VELIZ, PRIVACY
IS POWER: WHY AND HOW YOU SHOULD TAKE BACK CONTROL OF YOUR DATA 110 (2006).
436 See generally Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification to Identity Theft: Public
Perceptions of Biometric Privacy Harms, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 107 (2019).
437 D
ION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 53 (expanding on increasing security
breaches and hacks); see also Wang & De Filippi, supra note 434; VELIZ, supra note 435
(“[E]very day of every week hackers break into networks and steal data about people.
Sometimes they use that data to commit fraud. Other times they use it for shaming,
extortion or coercion.”).
438 See generally Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory
of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737 (2018) (discussing the tremendous damage
caused by data breach).
439
Stored information can be hacked. See Peter C. Ormerod, A Private Enforcement
Remedy for Information Misuse, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1893, 1894–95 (2019).
440
See Solove & Citron, supra note 438, at 745.
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information from being collected and stored. Rather, regulators
should focus on effective data security and restrict insecure designs
that create unwarranted privacy risks.441
Two design features can mitigate the risk of data breach harm.
First, users’ personal data should be encrypted. Encryption will enable a high level of confidentiality.442 It is an effective tool for citizens and businesses to defend themselves against technological
abuse, such as hacking, identity and personal data theft, fraud, and
improper disclosure of confidential information.443 Enhancing privacy protections promotes the security of technology users.444 Various legal regimes governing data breaches even exempt encrypted
information from data breach notification requirements.445
Second, encryption can be combined with anonymization techniques.446 The personal identifiers can be de-anonymized and identified only when a court warrant requires. Though such a design is
not absolute because hackers can de-anonymize information,447 it

441

See Daniel J. Solove, The Myth of the Privacy Paradox, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 50
(2021).
442 See Rocio de la Cruz, Privacy Laws in the Blockchain Environment, A
NNALS
EMERGING TECHS. COMPUTING, Dec. 2019, at 34, 39 (“[E]ncrypting the data by choosing
an encryption option that ensures a high level of confidentiality. The solution I recommend
here to minimise risks of breaching the law and/or facing a data breach incident, is
anonymizing the personal data to the maximum extent that still allows the Blockchain
achieve it [sic] purpose.”).
443
See Encryption, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/cybercrime/
encryption_sv [https://perma.cc/5PCY-UG8G].
444
See HOUBEN & SNYERS, supra note 193, at 55; see also A. Michael Froomkin & Zak
Colangelo, Privacy as Safety, 95 WASH. L REV. 141, 159 (2020).
445
See Mark Verstraete & Tal Zarsky, Optimizing Breach Notification, 2021 U. ILL. L.
REV. 803, 811–12 (2020) (referring to GDPR, Article 34(3)(a)); see also Jennifer J.
Hennessy et al., State Data Breach Notification Laws, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP,
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2019/01/state-data-breach-notificationlaws [https://perma.cc/7767-ZDRZ] (Mar. 1, 2022).
446
See de la Cruz, supra note 442, at 39 (proposing to combine encryption with
anonymization techniques).
447
For information on the shortcomings of anonymization, see Paul Ohm, Broken
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 1701, 1703 (2010).
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increases the price they pay for data misuse, reducing the risk of
identity theft.448
Beyond mitigating data misuse risks, anonymization and encryptions will make it easier to implement the proposed reform. By
anonymizing and encrypting the users’ identities, cryptocurrency issuers, exchanges, and wallet providers can avoid violations of the
shifting regulatory landscape under the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”).449 This regulation is a component of EU policies meant to limit commercial audiences’ abilities to resend, sell,
and share private information.450 It protects EU citizens’ data; yet it
also applies to non-EU companies offering goods or services to EU
consumers.451 Thus, it can affect data protection throughout the
world.
The GDPR contains a threshold test for international transfers of
personal data to non-member states and a legal basis for blocking
data exports to states that do not meet its “adequacy” standard.452
With regard to transmissions to the United States, instead of an adequacy determination, the European Union and the United States
reached an arrangement called the “Privacy Shield”: a voluntary,
private-sector compliance program.453 Yet, recently the European

448

See Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L.
REV. 703, 703 (2016) (arguing that anonymization should focus on the process of
minimizing risk of reidentification and sensitive attribute disclosure, not preventing harm).
449 Commission Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR]; Alexandra
Giannopoulou, Putting Data Protection by Design on the Blockchain, 7 EUR. DATA PROT.
L REV. 388, 399 (2021) (“The use of encryption techniques as central features to the design
of blockchains, would make them appear in compliance with part of the data protection by
design obligations, since encryption is particularly underlined in article 25(1) GDPR.”).
450
Alexander Tsesis, Data Subjects’ Privacy Rights: Regulation of Personal Data
Retention and Erasure, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 593, 594 (2019).
451 Michael L. Rustad, How the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation Will Protect
Consumers Using Smart Devices, 52 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 227, 228 (2019).
452 See Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771,
771 (2019).
453 The privacy shield replaced the safe haven agreement. In Schrems v. Data Protection
Commissioner, the ECJ declared that this safe harbor was invalid. Case C-362/14, Schrems
v. Data Prot. Comm’r, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015). Following this decision, the
US and the EU reached a new arrangement called the Privacy Shield. It should be noted
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Court of Justice in Luxembourg struck down the privacy shield in
the case of Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland and
Maximillian Schrems,454 determining that the Privacy Shield did not
limit access to data by U.S. authorities “in a way that satisfies requirements that are essentially equivalent to those required under
EU law. . . .”455 The long-term impact of the ruling remains unclear.456 but it is obvious that the GDPR has a global impact today,
now more than ever.
As explained above, the GDPR poses limitations on data processing and retention, and aims to better safeguard data subjects’
personal autonomy and dignity.457 The limitations and restrictions
posed by the GDPR apply to “personal data,” that is, “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.”458
However, anonymizing data can render the GDPR inapplicable; if
anonymization is fully achieved, the data does not relate to an identified person anymore.459 Indeed, the method of anonymization must
achieve full anonymity460 and not settle with pseudonymization.461
If data on cryptocurrency identities is only pseudonymized, cryptocurrency companies (as controllers of the data) will be required to
that the legal future remains uncertain and is dependent on the outcome of another ruling
by the CJEU. See Case C-311/18, Data Protect. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. & Schrems,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020); see also The Schrems Saga Continues: Schrems II
Case Heard Before the CJEU, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH: PRIV. & INFO. SEC. L. BLOG (July
10, 2019), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2019/07/10/the-schrems-saga-continuesschrems-ii-case-heard-before-the-cjeu/ [https://perma.cc/HEU3-LFRE].
454 C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. & Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶
198–200 (July 16, 2020).
455
Id. ¶ 185.
456
See Edward W. McLaughlin, Schrems’s Slippery Slope: Strengthening Governance
Mechanisms to Rehabilitate EU-U.S. Cross-Border Data Transfers After Schrems II, 90
FORDHAM L. REV. 217, 226 (2021).
457 See Tsesis, supra note 450, at 594.
458
GDPR, supra note 449, at art. 4(1).
459 See id. at Recital 26.
460 Information is anonymized if the information cannot be associated with a natural
individual (taking into account the means it is reasonably likely to be used, including the
available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments). Id.
461
Id. at art. 4(5) (defining pseudonymization as “the processing of personal data in such
a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without
the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept
separately and is subject to technical and organizational measures to ensure that the
personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person.”).
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implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure that processing is performed in accordance with the GDPR.462
However, they can still benefit from several relaxed standards under
the GDPR463 but will bear costs in complying with GDPR standards
as information controllers.
Yet, if the goal of full anonymization is achieved and the data
subject is no longer identifiable, cryptocurrency issuers, exchanges,
and wallet providers will not be subject to additional data protection
obligations under the GDPR.464
E. Global Law Enforcement
The fifth difficulty is a pragmatic one. Enforcement of identity
verification and unmasking obligations raises jurisdictional enforcement concerns. Because terrorists use cryptocurrencies globally and
rarely limit their financial activities to a single territory, enforcing
the proposed regulation on wallet providers in different jurisdictions
presents challenges.465 Regulatory efforts of countries that are limited to local regulation are likely to be futile.466 This claim is supported by recent calls of members from the G20 forum to regulate
cryptocurrencies on a global level.467
Yet, as in other domains, in the absence of global regulatory
standards, there are multiple tools for coordination among regulators
462

See id. at art. 5.
See, e.g., id. at art. 6(4)(e) (referring to processing for other compatible purposes that
can be allowed for pseudonymized data).
464 See Waltraut Kotschy, The New General Data Protection Regulation—Is There
Sufficient Pay-Off for Taking the Trouble to Anonymize or Pseudonymize Data?, LUDWIG
BOLTZMANN INST. FOR HUM. RTS., VIENNA (Nov. 2016), fpf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/Kotschy-paper-on-pseudonymisation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RY5Y-4TBZ].
465 See Israel Klein, It’s Time to Mind the GASB, 54 S
AN DIEGO L. REV. 565, 608 (2017)
(suggesting tax benefits related to bonds issued by a political subdivision be conditional
upon compliance with better financial disclosure).
466 For the related context of data flows between borders, see VELIZ, supra note 435, at
188; see also Hadar Y. Jabotinsky & Barak Yarkoni, The Network Effects of International
Financial Regulation 30 (Hebrew Univ. Jerusalem Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series No. 1904, 2018).
467 Try Ted Knutson, Crypto Assets Could Threaten Financial Stability Globally Warns
G20 Group, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2022, 8:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedknutson/
2022/02/16/crypto-assets-could-threaten-financial-stability-globally-warns-g20group/?sh=1b6a914f68a1 (last visited Apr. 5, 2022).
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and law enforcement agencies.468 For example, in the context of finance, “a global policy framework—grounded in UN Security
Council resolutions, national legislation, and global standards—”
was established to block terrorists’ access to the formal financial
system.469 Still, agencies, financial intelligence units, and law enforcement officials should “work to stay ahead of the evolving threat
of terrorist financing, which is influenced by changes in the global
financial system” and emerging financial technologies.470 Thus,
they should also work together to develop a framework for cooperation in the context of enforcing obligations imposed on cryptocurrency wallet providers, exchanges, and issuing firms.471 “International collaboration is crucial to successfully impose and enforce
rules on combating . . . terrorist financing” and strengthening the
global fight against terrorism as a whole.472 Developing a global
framework to address these challenges does not undermine the proposed regulation. To the contrary, a global framework of international enforcement and collaboration would enable complete global
application of the proposed regulation, rendering it more efficient.
CONCLUSION
Terrorism is not new; the first acts of terrorism were perpetrated
at least 2,000 years ago.473 Yet, new technologies are emerging rapidly, expanding the extensive reach of terrorism and rendering it
more dangerous and deadly.474 New technologies raise new questions and problems that legislators, policymakers, law enforcement,
and intelligence agencies must address to mitigate national security
468

See DION-SCHWARZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 52. In the context of child pornography,
states can rely on assistance from other states in accordance with the Convention on
Cybercrime, which requires cooperation to promote criminal investigations and
procedures. Convention on Cybercrime art. 14, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. 185.
469 Goldman et al., supra note 16, at 4.
470 Id. at 10.
471 See id. at 34.
472 See HOUBEN & SNYERS, supra note 193, at 10, 58.
473
See Mark Burgess, A Brief History of Terrorism, POGO (Feb. 13, 2015), https://
www.pogo.org/investigation/2015/02/brief-history-of-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/3DRXU2FG].
474 See Lavi, supra note 42, at 489.
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risks. This Article focused on the problem of cryptocurrencies as an
enabler for the flow of terrorist funding. It argued that the law should
respond to changes in the terrorism financing ecosystem and address
the challenges arising from terrorists’ use of cryptocurrencies that
threaten national security.
Because cryptocurrencies are built on peer-to-peer networks, allowing users to trade tokens without relying on financial institutions
as intermediaries, traditional solutions that target the flow of finance
are infeasible. Therefore, policymakers should adopt a new framework to address cryptocurrencies’ role in illicit funding.
This Article then proposed new user identity verification obligations on wallet providers, cryptocurrency exchanges, and the firms
issuing the tokens. It further offered that the identity of users should
not be available to all, but rather should only be unmasked by a court
warrant where there exists probable cause of illicit financial transactions or transfers. Thus, the proposed framework endeavors to
reach a balance between national security concerns and the fundamental Fourth Amendment rights of users.
Finally, this Article responded to potential objections and shortcomings of the proposed framework. This Article explained that the
proposed framework has a vast potential to meet the challenges
posed by illicit cryptocurrency use for financing terrorism, and to
mitigate the growing national security and public safety risks. Such
a framework is preferable to turning a blind eye to the growing use
of cryptocurrency for illicit funding. It is also superior to banning
the use of cryptocurrencies altogether. We therefore conclude with
a call for policymakers and legislators to adopt the proposed framework.

